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ABSTRACT 
IP arbitrability in international commercial disputes encapsulates the 
friction between traders and holders, between private contracts and public 
registers, between party autonomy and mandatory rules. Particularly, non-
arbitrability of invalidity defenses concerning registered industrial 
intellectual property rights has been insufficiently analyzed as a crucial 
matter of recognition and enforcement of international awards. 
Consequently, a sound economic rationale on grounds of competitive 
advantages is disregarded in too many instances. Having regarded the ever-
growing importance of IP rights for companies’ productivity and today’s 
primary use of arbitration in cross-border contracting, the present research 
aims at pointing that out. It applies a transaction cost economics approach 
and takes into account the legal comparative background. This study finally 
examines arbitrability of IP validity with inter-partes effect as an operable 
solution and the advantages of a predictable model as was early adopted by 
the United States.  
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BOE  Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official State Gazette of Spain) 
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Court of Justice, ECJ) 
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IP/IPR  Intellectual Property/ Intellectual Property Right(s) 
LA   Ley de Arbitraje 60/2003 (Spanish Arbitration Act 60/2003) 
Model Law UNCITRAL MODEL LAW on International Commercial 
Arbitration, adopted on 21 June 1985 and amended in 2006 
NY Conv. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York on 10 June 
1958 
OEPM Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas (Patents and 
Trademarks Office of Spain) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Official 
Journal 115, 05/2008) 
TRIPs Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (1994) 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization 
ZPO  Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure)  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Hypothesis 
If you think that justice is expensive, try injustice. 
       ANONYMOUS1 
In the last seventy years, modern means of transport operating on better 
infrastructures have shortened geographical distances. Countless treaties 
have facilitated international trade and supranational policies have promoted 
the free circulation of resources. In this context, the internet has transformed 
communication while newly-developed technologies have moved forward 
existent state-of-the-art. Lastly, insurgent on-and-offline business models 
have shaken up entire economies.2 
In this economic environment, companies’ performance and ultimate 
survival rely on specialization and innovation to create sustainable 
competitive advantages internationally. Either on contracting with least-cost 
suppliers, on targeting emerging markets worldwide or on better diversifying 
operations geographically.3 In so doing, the international enforcement of 
several intellectual property rights first appeared as the essential factor. By 
avoiding any unlawful appropriation of firms’ intangible assets, it guaranteed 
returns on investments incentivizing companies to specialize and innovate. 
These factors notwithstanding, it is nowadays affirmed that this 
“incentive model” only provides, at best, a partial justification for IP 
systems.4 While it is true that internationally recognized IP rights protect 
innovation, cutting-edge technologies and new product positioning and 
support their commercialization,5 it is classic commercial contracting that 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 382 (6th ed. 2016). 
2 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND 
COMPETITORS 287–88, 359 (1980) (identifying “environmental triggers to globalization”) [hereinafter 
PORTER (1980)]; MICHAEL E. PORTER, SER COMPETITIVO 361–62, 359 (2009) [hereinafter PORTER 
(2009)]. 
3 CHROCZIEL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES—A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1–2 (2017). 
4 Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 474 (2005). 
5 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1477, 1487–89 (2005) (The author identifies two transactional roles of IP and explains an impact on 
precontractual liability and on enforcement flexibility.). 
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continues to articulate most of these transactions. Whereas transactions can 
be upheld by any means, for example resorting to informal rules, contracts 
are, in principle, legally enforceable promises.6 Hence, contracts structure a 
formal institutional framework for an effective as well as efficient 
international coordination of cross-border interdependencies.7 They exist 
between and among IP right-holders and IP traders competing on 
productivity. 
In this new economic paradigm, the imperious need for specialization 
and innovation holds true for almost all players. On the one hand, from an 
organizational theory, it not only concerns global industries or multinational 
companies, such as Honda, Novo-Nordisk Group, Hewlett-Packard (HP) or 
IBM. It also chases companies operating in smaller multi-jurisdictional or 
even domestic environments. This results from a vertical disintegration that 
forces market players to specialize on some activities and outsource others to 
least-cost suppliers, often by undertaking cross-border moves.8 On the other 
hand, from a supply chain perspective, specialization and innovation are 
regarded not at an intra- but mainly at an inter-company level, creating 
significant firm-to-firm dependencies.9 
As a result, many scholars have identified and analyzed contractual 
coordination of IP rights as something missed by the “incentive model” of IP 
Law.10 In the present research, however, the key coordination of IP rights is 
studied from another transactional viewpoint: the economics of contract 
enforcement. Particularly, how international arbitration policies enable or 
disrupt formal transactions on: specialization, least-cost outsourcing, 
geographical diversification of firms’ operational portfolios, innovation, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Id. at 1515 (“[t]ransactions are not quite the same as contracts . . . .” In this research, the debate 
basically relates to contracts, running the risk of confusing the concept with it hypernym: transactions.). 
7 See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 39 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 595, 597 (2000) (use chart for the qualification of contracts as formal institutional 
context). 
8 See Section III.C infra; MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND 
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 275–77 (1985) [hereinafter PORTER (1985)]; PORTER (2009), 
supra note 2, at 361–62, 367; Merges, supra note 5, at 1517 (see the self-explanatory chart). 
9 Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 
795–97 (2010–2011). 
10 Id. at 787–88. This scholarly approach is known as Transaction Cost Economics. E.g., Merges, 
supra note 5, at 1486; see Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 220–22 (2012). The following Section I.B, infra, better explains how this 
scientific methodology is applied to this research. 
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expansion to new markets. As the ultimate point, how all this effects the 
generation of competitive advantages,11 which not only result in companies’ 
performance and survival but in increases of States’ GDPs.12 
The hypothesis of this research is thus to demonstrate, from an economic 
viewpoint, that the right approach to arbitrability of IP disputes has much to 
add to, or subtract from, the needed coordination on specialization and 
innovation. Whereas arbitrability of IP validity with inter-partes effect, as 
early adopted by the United States system, seems an operable solution, its 
pitfalls must be considered. These topics are discussed at a cross-border level 
under the auspices of Article V(2)(a)(b) of the New York Convention. 
Four facts demonstrate the relevance of this hypothesis: First, the ever-
growing importance of commercial arbitration as a mechanism for 
adjudicating certain IP disputes in cross-border businesses.13 Second, a 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 See Section III.C infra; Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 
711, 715 (2012) (stating: “[i]nvention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, 
phenomenon”); Barnett, supra note 9, at 836 (“[f]ailure to match the cost efficiencies made available by 
outsourcing supply chain functions to least-cost outside providers inherently results in a competitive 
disadvantage.”). 
12 JUSTINE PILA & PAUL TORREMANS, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2016); 
TREVOR COOK & ALEJANDRO I. GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARBITRATION 15, 
45 (2010) (Discussing some reasons for technology transfer as follows: “[t]here are numerous motivations 
underlying the negotiation and grant of patent licenses [. . .] [f]or example a patentee may lack the 
resources to exploit its patent in all jurisdictions; a technology developed for on type of business may 
have application in other areas in which the patentee has no commercial ambition, or a company with an 
established product may take a license to enable it to improve upon an enhance its existing technology”; 
stressing the attractiveness of international arbitration for resolving global IP disputes.); see infra Section 
III.C (for the economic analysis); PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 287–88. 
13 WIPO, WIPO Caseload Summary, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/ 
amc/en/center/caseload.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (For data, see the table covering the period 2009–
2017.); cf. Kenneth R. Adamo, Overview of International Arbitration in the Intellectual Property Context, 
2 GLOB. BUS. L. REV. 7, 8 (2011); Jacques De Werra, Global Policies for Arbitrating Intellectual Property 
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 375–76 (2013); Luke 
Nottage, Chapter 5: A Weather Map for International Arbitration: Mainly Sunny, Some Cloud, Possible 
Thunderstorms, in THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 59–78, 64 (Stavros 
L. Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2016) (see chart for the expansion of 
arbitration around the globe); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 9–16 
(2012) [hereinafter BORN (2012)] (the author provides an introduction to reasons for adopting 
international commercial arbitration); NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN & HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 28–39 (6th ed. 2015). 
Particularly regarding IP disputes, see COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 49; PILA & TORREMANS, supra 
note 12, at 30; Pedro Alberto De Miguel Asensio, Alcance de la Arbitrabilidad de los Litigios Sobre 
Derechos de Propiedad Industrial, 7 MAG. COM. & INV. ARB. 81, 84 (2014). 
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highly controversial situation given the lack of consistent answers across 
jurisdictions worldwide.14 Third, the need to enrich the debate on the topic 
whose discussion has so far been largely limited to legal arguments. Fourth, 
a novel application of transaction cost economics to think about international 
arbitration policies, rather than IP rights or IP contracts as the focal 
institutional framework. 
B. An Intersection between Law, Business and Economy 
To develop the outlined hypothesis, the general toolkit for legal analysis 
is complemented with two specific methodologies. Review of primary 
sources, of case law and of academic literature is thus jointly conducted with 
studies in private comparative law and law and economics. This combination 
of methodologies responds to the concrete analytical challenges posed by the 
identified interdisciplinary hypothesis and to the continuum that social 
sciences arguably together constitute.15 
In the continuum, private comparative law suggests a geographical 
approach. With it, causes or reasons for the global heterogeneity of legal 
backgrounds as well as cultural differences are somehow present.16 Law and 
economics is here taken in a broad sense, bringing it close to new institutional 
economics (NIE) by focusing on how context influences economic 
activities.17 As a result, the economic study of the IP coordination problem 
                                                                                                                           
 
It is worth noting that exploitation of IP rights is no longer limited to commercial arbitration but 
has extended to investment arbitration, where foreign investors claim that patent systems violate 
investment-treaty obligations. See CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3. 
See Banco Santander Totta S.A. v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa S.A. (et al.) [2016] 
EWHC 465, [65]–[81] (UK) (For the distinction between national or international, in terms of dispute.); 
BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 13, at 7–8, 11 (for the distinction in terms of arbitration proceedings); see 
also Section II.C.4.a, infra. 
14 See infra Section II.C.4 (discussing classification of the different policies in a comparative law 
study). 
15 The present work is, of course, focused on law. See Pablo Salvador Coderch & Sergi Morales 
Martínez, Verdad y Veracidad: El Derecho Naturalizado, INDRET PRIVATE LAW, 2017, at 6, 10 
(extending the social sciences continuum from technologic to common knowledge). 
16 INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND 
CONTRACT LAW 1 (2012) (See paras. 1.02 and 1.03 for an explanation of the functional comparative 
approach as a scientific method to analyze legal systems from a neutral position.). 
17 Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of Sequential 
Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2017). NIE was partly founded by the 2009 Nobel Prize 
winner Oliver E. Williamson and followed by many scholars in the IP field. See Oliver E. Williamson, 
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applies both: a transaction cost economics (TCE) approach, which places 
transactions in the spotlight,18 and a neoclassical analysis of the economics 
of contract enforcement, whose notion of welfare is reduced to parties’ 
surplus. In so doing, arguments not only have spillovers to economics but 
also to behavioral economics and negotiation. Last but not the least, key 
conclusions are based on an analysis of competitiveness from a business 
standpoint.19 
In principle, economics of law allows us to focus on economic and social 
outcomes of rules, their impact on parties’ incentives, behaviors as well as 
social costs. The neoclassical view of economic theory is mainly interested 
in the marginal changes.20 New institutional economics extend the 
neoclassical rationales by introducing a novel, central role of institutions in 
order to explain economic activity.21 
These specific methodologies respectively apply to the two parts in 
which this work is split. Section II of this paper elaborates on arbitrability of 
IP validity in certain international disputes. It is further divided into three 
sub-sections, narrowing down the topic from three cumulative angles: 
(1) categories of IP rights concerned; (2) claims in dispute and contractual 
settings; and (3) non-arbitrability per Article V(2) of the New York 
Convention. This topic further accounts for a top-down legal comparative 
study under Section II.C.4, infra. On the one hand, a conceptual classification 
of the international status quo, including a future supranational system (the 
EU-UPC Agreement). On the other hand, two jurisdiction-specific surveys 
from both civil and common law backgrounds (Spain and the United States). 
The economics of non-arbitrability under the auspices of Article V(2) 
of the New York Convention are exhaustively examined in the first part of 
                                                                                                                           
 
Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction, ECONOMIC DISCUSSION PAPERS 599–610 (2007), http:// 
www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-3; Heald, supra note 4, at 475–78; 
Merges, supra note 5, at 1482–86, 1513–14; Barnett supra note 9, at 838. See Vertinsky, supra note 10, 
at 227–29 (For an introduction to NIE concerning IP policies.). An application of NIE to arbitration 
policies on IP rights was, however, still missing. 
18 The part of NIE that intends to explain economic activity by means of studying transactions as 
institutional framework has been referred as Transaction Cost Economics, see Williamson, supra note 17, 
at 608; Merges, supra note 5, at 1482–86. Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 216, rather moves towards the term 
Organizational Economics. 
19 See PHILIPP HACKER, VERHALTENSÖKONOMIK UND NORMATIVITÄT 3 et seq. (2017). 
20 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4–
7 (1987); HACKER, supra note 19, at 3 (et seq.); but cf. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract 
Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 879–80 (2003). 
21 Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 227. 
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Section III. Here, however, from three consecutive approaches: 
(1) introductory remarks on the contract principle for coordination taking a 
transactional cost economics perspective; (2) disruptions introduced by non-
enforcement of international awards on grounds of non-arbitrability; and 
(3) overall consequences on the competitive advantages at the micro- 
macroeconomic levels. 
Before concluding, the second part of Section III presents the solution 
supported hereby: a predictable, worldwide recognition and enforcement 
with inter-partes effect of international awards incidentally adjudicating on 
matters of IP validity. The practicability of this solution is, on the one hand, 
exemplified by its early adoption by the United States system and the 
tendency toward it demonstrated by leading French case law. On the other 
hand, the solution is confronted to its many legal and practical limitations, 
both at the post- and pre-award stage. 
II. LACK OF A DEFAULT JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL IP 
AWARDS 
A. Registered Industrial IP Rights 
For the purpose of this research, only four classes of intellectual 
property rights are relevant: (1) patents, (2) utility models, (3) registered 
designs, and, in most of the cases, (4) trademarks. These four property rights 
are particularly relevant because they present two cumulative traits: 
registered and industrial. Other categories of non-registered rights or non-
industrial rights are simply deemed arbitrable in most jurisdictions, less 
frequently adjudicated in international commercial IP arbitration, or have 
little impact on companies’ contest on competitive advantages. Either way, 
they do not raise the questions answered throughout this research. 
To briefly enumerate the rights accommodated by the notion of 
“intellectual property rights” at an international level, one can resort to 
Article 1(2) in conjunction with its Sections 1–7 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).22 These seven 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Michael W. Carroll, A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, in THE STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 15, 45 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras 
eds., 2011); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 1–2; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 99. The 
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sections encompass: copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs (topographies) of 
integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed information. 
For the sake of completeness, approaches taken by national IP systems 
may be totally different as regards non-industrial rights, such as copyright. 
Notably, they may have significant commercial value as well. In stark 
contrast with countries of common law tradition like the United States, civil 
law systems do not acknowledge disposition of moral rights attributed to the 
author of a protected work. As a result, they can arguably neither be 
arbitrated.23 
i. Registered stands for IP rights administered by competent public 
authorities and, accordingly, announced to the public upon 
registration. In other words, exclusionary powers that are granted 
by state-bodies after applying statutory criteria in the course of a 
substantive and formal process of examination. Precisely, this 
category of IP rights is enforceable with erga omnes effect—i.e. 
against third parties—due to their public conferral and subsequent 
registration. Disruptive non-arbitrability policies discussed 
hereinafter largely affect validity issues concerning these 
registered rights. In short, an “[a]rbitrator is somehow 
circumventing the public grant system.”24 
                                                                                                                           
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was incorporated by Annex 1C of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed on 15 Apr. 1994, 
constituting an integral part of the World Trade Organization. Therefore, all 164 WTO member states 
including the European Union by Decision 94/800/EU of the Council of 22 Dec. 1994 have today adopted 
the TRIPs. See also Anna P. Mantakou, Substantive Rules on Arbitrability: Chapter 13—Arbitrability and 
Intellectual Property Disputes, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 263, 
264 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 5–6; 
see Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 268–71 (from an organizational viewpoint based on new institutional 
economics). 
An analysis of the international IP law falls beyond the scope of this research, see PILA & 
TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 27–28 (for a structured overview of the principal sources). 
23 PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 4–5; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 52–53; 
CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 15, 18; Steven A. Certilman & Joel E. Lutzker, Arbitrability of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 
72, 78 (Thomas D. Halket ed., 2012). 
24 William Grantham, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property Disputes, 14 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 173, 199 (1996). 
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To sum up, (1) registered patents protect technical inventions and 
exceptionally their applications. They allow holders to 
exclusionary use and commercialize the protected innovation for 
20 years, subject to exceptions. For instance, uses for academic 
research and experimentation purposes are, to a certain extent, not 
legally encumbered. (2) Utility models follow the same rationale, 
covering technology innovations involving a less significant 
inventive step. Accordingly, the right-holder is entitled for a shorter 
period of time. (3) Registered industrial designs grant exclusionary 
use and commercialization for a period of 25 years. In contrast, 
whenever designs are not registered, fewer uses are reserved to the 
right-holder for a maximum period of 3 years. Finally, 
(4) trademarks, which are usually registered, vest their holders with 
an exclusionary sign of identification. This confers indefinite 
signaling of goods and services in the market, subject to limited 
exceptions. For instance, third parties’ legitimate use of own 
names.25 
ii. As to industrial,26 the relevant IP rights (patents, utility models, 
registered designs and trademarks) can be grouped under two 
categories: identification and innovation IP rights. Both categories 
relate to the vast majority of companies’ operations worldwide.27 
The former, identification, refers to those rights capable of 
signaling companies’ products and services in a given market as 
well as to distinguish them from those of competitors. The latter is 
the temporal protection of concepts for technological 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 PCT Patent Prosecution Highway (PCT-PPH) Pilot Programs, PCT Newsletter (World Intell. 
Prop. Org., Geneva, Switz.) Apr. 2018, at 7 (see specifically the “Practical Advice” subsection, “Seeking 
utility model protection instead of patent protection.”); Grantham, supra note 24, at 196; and from the IP 
law perspective, PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 5–6; Carroll, supra note 22, at 25–26 (discussing 
whether “one-size-fits-all” IP systems, mainly laid down by the TRIPs, should be replaced by tailored IP 
rights). 
26 PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 4, 7 n.6 (defining “[i]n the terminology of European law, 
all but copyright and related rights fall within the general category of industrial property rights” (emphasis 
added)). However, designs are regarded as a hybrid of copyright, patent and even trademarks. 
27 Id. at 4 (considering that industrial property rights are “[d]istinguished by their concern with 
industrial or commercial subject matter and activities”). 
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developments as regards the state-of-the-art.28 In today’s economic 
reality, both sub-groups of industrial IP rights are somehow 
present, when not central, in many of the cases adjudicated by 
international commercial arbitral tribunals.29 
B. Incidentally Adjudicating on IP Validity Defenses 
It is now relevant to establish a correlation between categories of IP 
disputes, applicable IP laws and arbitration. As a broader point apropos of 
applicable IP laws, it is crucial to stress the problems created by IP 
territoriality. The concept refers to three aspects: conferral of IP rights under 
national laws; restriction of legal effects of IP rights to the territory of their 
conferring state; and enforcement of foreign IP rights by the courts of the 
conferring state applying their domestic law. The minimum standards of the 
well-known Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(1883, as revised in 1979) came in response to IP territoriality.30 
Concerning the above-identified rights, two types of disputes may be 
subject to international commercial arbitration: (a) creation of rights; and 
(b) exploitation of rights.31 Despite the fact that creation disputes may 
equally pose difficult questions of arbitrability concerning ownership, only 
the latter is discussed in this research. This is justified because exploitation 
disputes are those directly linked with the cross-border commercial handling 
of such registered IP rights. In other words, exploitation disputes are the 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 See id. at 17 (for an overview on the purposes of granting industrial IP rights); id. at 15–19 (for 
the historical backgrounds of patents); id. at 19–20 (for trademarks (signs of commercial origin)). In 
economic terms, see Merges, supra note 5, at 1487–89; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 7 (3d ed. 2007). 
29 For instance, the statistics of WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center between 2009–2017 
illustrate that 45% of the cases involved industrial IP rights, mainly patents (28%) and trademarks (17%), 
see WIPO, supra note 13. 
30 The Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property (1883) counts 177 contracting 
states. It was revised in many occasions: at Brussels (1900), Washington (1911), The Hague (1925), 
London (1934), Lisbon (1958) and Stockholm (1967), and amended in 1979 (Paris Union). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the Paris Convention updated on 13  Apr. 2018; see WIPO, Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/paris/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). See also PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 31–33. 
31 Mantakou, supra note 22, at 269–70; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 11 (Pointing out that 
such classification is not always neat: “[a]greements that address both ownership and exploitation together 
may be encountered.”). 
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litigated outcome of the transactional environment hereby analyzed, namely 
international IP coordination. 
Furthermore, exploitation disputes typically arise out of, or in 
connection with, different kinds of IP contracting, on which this research is 
mainly focused. Patent or trademark license agreements and R&D 
cooperation contracts are only two examples.32 Noticeably, this IP 
contracting behind an exploitation case is what usually provides a private 
dispute resolution body with the authority to rule on the dispute. For most of 
the scenarios examined hereby, the underlying agreement included an 
arbitration clause.33 
Along the broad spectrum of exploitation disputes potentially swept into 
arbitration, matters that will be decided by arbitral tribunals can be classified 
in three categories: (i) contractual rights, obligations and breaches; 
(ii) tortious infringements; and (iii) validity claims. 
i. Contractual issues are the matters typically known by international 
arbitral tribunals. For example, these represent questions of 
interpretation, performance or breaches of agreements for the 
transfer of technology and commercialization of granted IP rights. 
None of them raise doubts as regards non-arbitrability policies 
since they have a clear contractual basis. With reference to the law, 
the relevant conflict-of-law rules determine the applicable contract 
law in the rare cases of absence of a choice-of-law clause in the 
agreement.34 For example, Article 4 of Rome I Regulation, 2008 
O.J. (L177) 6 (EC), on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I) provides EU member states with such a set of rules.35 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 See, e.g., WIPO, Intellectual Property Agreement Guide, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/rd/ipag/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (for templates of 
IP agreements). See also CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 94 (Identifying not only license agreements 
but other contractual manifestations such as “[a] dispute between joint venture partners concerning the 
value of IP contributed to a joint venture.”); Grantham, supra note 24, at 197 (for a hypothetical). 
33 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 52–53; but cf. infra point (ii) “Tort Issues.” 
34 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 82 n.103 (discussing an Interim Award in an ICC 
arbitration case (case no. 6097, 1989) where parties (a Japanese claimant and a German defendant) agreed 
that interpretation of the contract was governed by Japanese law); Adamo, supra note 13, at 10; Grantham, 
supra note 24, at 188–89; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 264; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 83, 101; 
COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 45, 74; De Werra, supra note 13, at 366. 
35 Rome I Regulation, 177/6 2008 O.J. (L177) 6 (EC) (on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations). Any further discussion about choice-of-law falls beyond the present research. See Franco 
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To illustrate, Article 61 WIPO Arbitration Rules sets forth: 
(a) The Tribunal shall decide the substance of the dispute in 
accordance with the law or rules of law chosen by the parties. Any 
designation of the law of a given State shall be construed, unless 
otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that 
State and not to its conflict of laws rules. Failing a choice by the 
parties, the Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law that it 
determines to be appropriate. In all cases, the Tribunal shall decide 
having due regard to the terms of any relevant contract and taking into 
account applicable trade usages. [. . .].36 
ii. Tort issues encompass infringement of granted IP rights. It is 
commonly upheld that torts affecting IP rights are arbitrable if the 
parties want to make them so. This consent occurs, on the one hand, 
if the relevant parties enter into an IP-exploitation agreement 
whose arbitration clause was drafted broadly enough to 
accommodate torts conflicts. That can be achieved by including in 
the arbitration clause formulations such as “all disputes arising out 
of” or “all disputes in connection with.”37 On the other hand, 
admittedly rarer, when after an infringement has occurred, 
concerned parties agree to submit the lawsuit to international 
arbitration. A major motivation for this is the possibility of solving 
the tort dispute in a single proceeding. This becomes particularly 
relevant for multijurisdictional or global IP litigation since parties 
                                                                                                                           
 
Ferrari, From Rome to Rome via Brussels, Remarks on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
Absent a Choice by the Parties, 73 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 750, 769 (2009); Ulrich Magnus, Article 4 Rome I Regulation: The Applicable Law in the 
Absence of Choice, in ROME I REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN 
EUROPE 27, 45 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible eds., 2009) (for an analysis of Article 4 compared with 
the Proposal for the Rome I Regulation). 
36 WIPO, WIPO Arbitration Rules Article 61, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., https://www 
.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
37 Cf. ICC, Arbitration Clause, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/arbitration/arbitration-clause/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (for the ICC’s Standard Arbitration 
Clause); Irene Welser & Susanne Molitoris, The Scope of Arbitration Clauses or All Disputes Arising out 
of or in Connection with this Contract, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17, 
24 (Klausegger et al. eds., 2012) (“[a]rbitration agreements covering all disputes out of a contract [. . .] 
encompass claims based on unjust enrichment and tort if the contractual violation and the harmful action 
are connected in a way that they must be seen as forming a unity.” (Emphasis added)). 
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can primarily avoid contradictory rulings, save time, reduce costs 
and secure market position.38 
Arguably, the type of arbitration agreement also influences the 
applicable law to the tortious dispute. Whenever the parties 
involved in a lawsuit of torts entered into an agreement containing 
a substantive choice-of-law clause, the chosen substantive law will 
govern the dispute of torts. On the contrary, if parties later decide 
to submit the dispute to arbitration, they may or may not agree on 
a substantive tort law.39 If a substantive law is not chosen, the 
applicable law is determined by the set conflict-of-laws rules, 
based upon the principle Lex Loci Protectionis. This refers to the 
law of the jurisdiction for which protection is sought. 
For instance, it is established for EU member states by the recital 
26 to the Rome II Regulation, 2007 O.J. (L864) (EC), on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II):40 
Regarding infringements of intellectual property rights, the 
universally acknowledged principle of the lex loci protectionis should 
be preserved. For the purposes of this Regulation, the term 
‘intellectual property rights’ should be interpreted as meaning, for 
instance, copyright, related rights, the sui generis right for the 
protection of databases and industrial property rights.41 
iii. Validity issues42 concerning registered industrial IP rights 
constitute the roadblock of commercial arbitration in an 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 13, at 72 (explaining that an agreement to arbitrate might be 
concluded by two main venues: an arbitration clause (ex ante) or a submission agreement (ex post)). See 
Mantakou, supra note 22, at 264; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 11, 46 (regarding IP law). For the 
economics of ex ante and ex post ADR—mainly of commercial arbitration—see Steven Shavell, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 38, 42–43, 45–46 (1996) 
(pointing out that submission agreements may arrive too late to create desirable incentives compared to 
arbitration clauses). 
39 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 82 n.103 (discussing an Interim Award in an ICC 
arbitration case (case no. 6097, 1989) where parties agreed that German law was the one applicable to 
infringement issues); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 74. 
40 ROME II REGULATION, 2007 O.J. (L864) (EC) (on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations) [hereinafter ROME II]; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 10 n.9; and De Werra, supra note 
13, at 368. 
41 ROME II, supra note 40, at ¶ 26. 
42 The term “[in]validity” also refers to “revocation,” “cancellation” or “enforceability.” These are 
alternative concepts adopted in different jurisdictions referring to the same challenge to existence of an 
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international context for IP contracting. This basically 
encompasses claims against the valid registration or subsistence of 
an IP right. Many jurisdictions adopt non-arbitrability polices, on 
grounds of public policy and third-party protection, that affect both 
agreements to arbitrate and resulting awards.43 This occurs 
irrespective of whether a validity claim was only ancillary claimed. 
In stark contrast, invalidity claims against other non-registered IP 
rights do not raise major arbitrability concerns, except for moral 
rights in copyright. 
As to applicable laws, it must be stressed that while a license 
agreement commonly provides for a substantive choice-of-law 
clause, the law of the jurisdiction according to which a registered 
IP right is granted generally governs the questions of validity. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered this in the 
IP case Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. University of Toronto 
Innovations Foundation, arguing that the arbitral tribunal seated in 
Canada should, if patent validity was found to fall within the 
agreement to arbitrate, apply U.S. patent law.44 
To sum up, all exploitation disputes over registered industrial IP rights 
resulting from commercial contracting are, in principle, arbitrable.45 This 
principally includes contractual and infringement issues, since there is an 
outstanding exception as to invalidity of publicly registered industrial IP 
rights. Consequently, arbitration of IP disputes becomes extremely 
complicated whenever non-arbitrable questions are raised together with, or 
                                                                                                                           
 
IP right. Matthew A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19 
HARV. J.L. &. TECH 299, 304; GRANTHAM, supra note 24, at 199 (for a hypothetical). 
43 See infra Section II.C.3 (the arguments for non-arbitrability policies); Certilman & Lutzker, 
supra note 23, at 71, 78 (stating: “[t]here should be less resistance to arbitrability of copyright disputes 
globally.”). 
44 In the argumentation, the court falls back on the leading decision Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 n.21 (1985) (concerning application of U.S. antitrust 
laws). See also Thomas Halket, Choice of Law in International Intellectual Property Arbitrations: A 
Three-Dimensional Chess Game?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2008, at 199, 215–18 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2009). Cf. De Werra, supra 
note 13, at 367. 
45 De Werra, supra note 13, at 357–59; Smith et al., supra note 42, at 304. 
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preliminarily to, any arbitrable matter.46 This is exactly the case of the 
validity defenses examined in this research. When asserted in the course of 
international IP arbitration, the tribunal has to incidentally adjudicate 
invalidity in order to decide on the principal contractual or tortious issues 
over patents, utility models, registered designs or trademarks. Defendants 
challenge the validity of the underlying right with the idea that a contract 
upon an invalid right cannot be breached or that invalid IP rights cannot be 
infringed. Such litigation strategy is mainly aimed at defending themselves 
from the contractual or tortious claims; nevertheless, it brings about 
significant consequences as discussed infra.47 
In practice, given that many international IP disputes which are 
adjudicated by arbitral tribunals arise out of license agreements, parties may 
be estopped from asserting the invalidity of the IP right in dispute. Such 
limitations occur whenever license contracts incorporate a “non-contest” (or 
“no-challenge”) clause. Notably, however, they are not enforceable under 
certain laws.48 
C. Non-Arbitrability Policies at the Enforcement Stage 
1. Remarks on Arbitrability and its Several Stages of Control 
Party autonomy is self-regulation, the most basic characteristic of 
arbitration. In the realm of contract law, party autonomy is captured by 
freedom of contract.49 According to the laws of many countries, freedom of 
contract finishes where public interest commences.50 Public interest is 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 52 (“[o]nly disputes involving the invalidity of registered 
IPR are likely to give rise to such concerns [arbitrability].”); Smith et al., supra note 42, at 304. 
47 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 76 (stressing that: “[w]hile often masquerading as, or 
intertwined with, causes of action for infringement [. . .] can implicate validity concerns”); De Miguel 
Asensio, supra note 13, at 88–90, 94; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 269–70 (“[v]ery often, issues involving, 
for example, validity or ownership may arise in the form of preliminary issues in the context of a dispute 
involving a license agreement.”); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 7; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 14, 94; JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 119 (2013) (“[t]o prevent respondents from using 
unmeritorious protestations of invalidity as a delaying tactic.”). 
48 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 53. 
49 SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 16, at 64–67, paras. 4.47–4.63. 
50 See, e.g., Banque Arabe et Int’l d’Inv. v. Inter-Arab Inv. Guarantee Corp., 11 MEALEY’S INT’L 
ARB. REP. 1 (1994); Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 55; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 13, at 71; 
COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 50; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 5, 29. 
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essentially enshrined in mandatory rules, which sanction contracts by 
declaring them non-enforceable, usually on grounds of substantive 
invalidity.51 
In international commercial IP arbitration, agreements to arbitrate and 
resulting awards are scrutinized against applicable mandatory contract and 
arbitration legislation, which set forth the substantive and formal validity 
requirements.52 Among these mandatory rules, there is a particular limit on 
freedom of contract as regards commercial arbitration: the doctrine of non-
arbitrability, also known as objective arbitrability.53 
This refers to the determination by law of which matters in a dispute, 
under the rules of a given jurisdiction, that can be heard before and 
adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal. On the flip side, are matters that are to be 
exclusively dealt with by state courts. In a nutshell, states allow, by means of 
their mandatory law on allocation of jurisdiction,54 to refer only a limited 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 See, e.g., Article 6(3) C.C. (As this research is partly set around the Spanish legal system, the 
most fitting example here is Article 6(3) of the Spanish Civil Code, which reads: “3. Los actos contrarios 
a las normas imperativas y a las prohibitivas son nulos de pleno derecho, salvo que en ellas se establezca 
un efecto distinto para el caso de contravención.” [“[a]cts contrary to mandatory and prohibitive rules 
shall be null and void by operation of law, save where such rules should provide for a different effect in 
the event of violation.” Official translation, http://derechocivil-ugr.es/attachments/article/45/spanish-
civil-code.pdf].). 
52 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1st civ., Sept. 26, 2012, No. 11-
26022 (Fr.) (Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild Europe case as an example of substantive invalidity 
of an agreement, concerning “one-direction” arbitration clauses). For formal invalidity—and thus 
ineffectiveness under Article II of the New York Convention—see the well-known decision Kahn Lucas 
Lancaster v. Lark International Ltd., 186 F.3d 2010 (2d Cir. 1999). In the literature see BORN (2012), 
supra note 13, at 73–76 (as regards formal validity) 77–86 (regarding the substantive validity) 82–86 (for 
non-arbitrability doctrine). 
53 Grantham, supra note 24, at 179; De Werra, supra note 13, at 356; Ulrich Haas, Commentary on 
Article V New York Convention, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 483, 
519 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 2002); Smith et al., supra note 42, at 305; Joachim Münch, § 1030 ZPO, 
in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (Wolfgang Krüger & Thomas Rauscher eds., 
5th ed. 2017) (about “Schiedsfähigkeit”); Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 55–56; CHROCZIEL ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 13; INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
124 (Várady et al. eds., 6th ed. 2015) (pointing out the broader meaning that is sometimes given in the 
United States to non-arbitrability: “[c]overing all questions relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal.”); in this regard, see infra Section II.C.4.c. 
54 For the mandatory character of these laws when interacting with arbitration agreements: Carr & 
Anor v. Gallaway Cook Allan [2014] NZSC 75 (N.Z.). It must be noticed that non-arbitrability, as 
explained in Section II.C.4, infra, can be determined either by the arbitral law itself or by the applicable 
IP-law. See also Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International 
Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 23, 27 (1997). 
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range of disputes to arbitration.55 As a creature of contract, arbitration is 
curtailed depending on the nature and subject matter of the dispute at hand. 
For instance, non-arbitrability is ultimately reflected in criminal or divorce 
cases. In commercial disputes, it has been usually upheld concerning: 
(a) competition and antitrust claims, (b) securities claims, (c) certain IP 
disputes (as discussed here), or (d) bankruptcy.56 
Therefore, although parties to an IP transaction might consider it 
mutually beneficial to agree to an arbitration proceeding to solve any 
potential disputes,57 this agreement may end up not being effective to a 
certain extent (i.e. partial invalidity), if at all. Even if the parties enter into a 
valid arbitration agreement having fulfilled the substantive and formal 
requirements under the chosen contract law, or the applicable one according 
to conflict-of-law rules pursuant to the Separability Doctrine,58 the 
arbitration agreement will not be effective on grounds of invalidity. This 
results from the mandatory provisions on allocation of jurisdiction embodied 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1030(1) (Ger.) (for an illustrative 
example); Dennis Solomon, The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in Germany, 
in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS 329, 364–65 (George A. Berman 
ed., 2017) (for a report of the application under the New York Convention). 
56 BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 83–84; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 51; PAULSSON, supra 
note 47, at 117, 123; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 56. 
57 See a general analysis of ADR mechanisms (but mainly of arbitration) as mutually beneficial 
agreements in Shavell, supra note 38, at 42–46, 43 (for an example); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, 
CONTRACTING 11–12 (2004). Regarding desirable enforceability of such agreements, see the limitations 
outlined in Shavell, supra note 38, at 45; see also Section III.A (et seq.), infra. 
58 See, e.g., Article 16(1) (2d and 3d sent.) Model Law; this research falls short to discussing 
Separability Doctrine; see John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability 
and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1116 
(2003); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 55. 
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in the arbitration law59 and/or in the applicable IP law.60 Noticeably, 
ineffectiveness of an agreement will at best only extend to non-arbitrable 
matters. 
For the sake of clarification, it is not the mandatory nature of rules what 
per se obstructs arbitration, but the public interest and policies that they 
usually enshrine. Arbitrators have the duty to enforce mandatory rules in 
private proceedings, like antitrust law.61 All are illustratively laid down by 
the New York Convention, whose Article II(1) reads: 
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen 
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration.62 
Alternatively, but on the same grounds, violation of the mandatory rules on 
allocation of jurisdiction may lead state courts of the country in which the 
arbitration was seated to set aside an international award, according to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrabilidad de los Derechos de la Propiedad Industrial y 
de la Competencia, in ANUARIO DE JUSTICIA ALTERNATIVA 11, 40 (2017) (Stating, “[a]n arbitration 
agreement over an non-arbitrable matter is invalid and the arbitrators cannot render a valid arbitration 
award.”). Additionally, following BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 111, it must be noticed that the reference 
is not made to domestic (i.e. national) civil procedure law but to domestic arbitration law, which also 
establishes the national legal framework for conducting arbitration at an international level. Arbitration 
laws worldwide are usually modeled on the Model Law, as exemplified by Karl Hienz Böckstiegel et al., 
Part I: Germany as a Place for International and Domestic Arbitrations—General Overview, in 
ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 4, 5 (Karl Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan Kröll & 
Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2d ed. 2015) (“[f]orty-one sections of the new German arbitration law contained 
in the 10th Book of the Code of Civil Procedure (§§ 1025–1066 ZPO) are to a large extent a verbatim 
adoption of the Model Law.”). 
60 See Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros, S.A. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. [2012] EWCA Civ. 
638 (UK) (The Court of Appeals, confirming the decision of the High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench 
Division, considered that the applicable law to the enforcement of the disputed arbitration agreement 
contained in the insurance policy was the law of the seat of arbitration chosen by the parties, i.e., English 
law, instead of Brazilian law, which was the law governing the rest of the contract); BORN (2012), supra 
note 13, at 82. 
61 PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 133–34; Viscasillas, supra note 59, at 45; Blessing, supra note 54, 
at 24; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639 n.21; see infra Section II.C.2 (for further 
discussion). 
62 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards Article II(1), 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]; cf. Eur. Convention on Int’l Comm. 
Arb. 1961, Article VI(2), which reads: “[t]he courts may also refuse recognition of an arbitration 
agreement if under the law of their country the dispute is not capable of settlement.”; but cf. CHROCZIEL 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 11. 
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well-known Second Look Doctrine.63 Finally, a foreign award can also 
simply be left unrecognized and unenforced at the jurisdiction where 
enforcement is later sought by the winning party. This occurs under the 
auspices of the New York Convention, although courts are often unclear 
whether it is a matter of arbitrability or public policy pursuant to arts. V(2)(a) 
and (2)(b), respectively: 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.64 
In conclusion, it is evidenced that control of arbitrability may take place in 
three main stages of every international arbitral proceeding. In addition, and 
probably more disrupting, an agreement to arbitrate or a resulting award may 
end up reviewed under different laws:65 
i. At the outset, if a party to arbitration files a claim in a state court 
challenging the enforceability of an arbitration clause on grounds 
of non-arbitrability of the disputed matters, substantive and formal 
issues of the agreement to arbitrate will be subject to the choice-of-
law clause, if any. Instead, non-arbitrability is based on mandatory 
rules on allocation of jurisdiction contained in IP laws or the 
arbitration framework of the state where the arbitration 
proceedings are seated. Notwithstanding this, parties’ challenges to 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 See the leading decisions: C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 
E.C.R. I-3055 (concerning competition law); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639 n.21 (also 
concerning competition law). The latter upheld antitrust claims as arbitrable in international proceedings 
because U.S. courts will have, at the subsequent stage of enforcement, an opportunity to “second look” 
and to ensure that the legitimate interest in the compliance with antitrust laws has been addressed in 
arbitration. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a deferential position towards arbitrability 
doctrine decided by the arbitral tribunal at the commencement of the proceedings. 
64 Article V(2)(a) & (b) New York Convention (emphasis added); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 
1(5) (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.) reads in similar terms [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]. 
65 L. Yves Fortier, Arbitrability of Disputes, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 269, 274–79 
(Asken et al. eds., 2005); and COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 53–55; for control of arbitrability on 
public policy grounds see Section II.C.3, infra. 
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arbitral jurisdiction are procedurally limited. Such submissions are 
only possible if they are lodged no later than the constitution of the 
tribunal or when a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction is challenged 
before the courts of the seat, both pursuant to arts. 6 and 16(3) of 
the Model Law as adopted by many national laws.66 
Preferably, any control over arbitrability is usually decided by the 
arbitral tribunal itself. This results from the doctrine of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.67 Here again, parties are generally curtailed by 
procedural law from submitting challenges to arbitral tribunals’ 
jurisdiction any later than by the submission of the defense 
statement.68 The tribunal´s own decisions on competence are to be 
conceptually seen as a trade-off with the above-mentioned Second 
Look doctrine. Therefore, the more jurisdictional leeway arbitrators 
are granted with at the commencement of the proceedings, the 
stricter the review of state courts will be at a later phase (of award 
recognition and enforcement)—and vice versa. 
ii. Arbitrability is also reviewed at the final stage of recognition and 
enforcement of the resulting award. On the one hand, by filing an 
                                                                                                                           
 
66 In this regard, see, e.g., Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1032(2) (Ger.) 
(“(2) Bei Gericht kann bis zur Bildung des Schiedsgerichts Antrag auf Feststellung der Zulässigkeit oder 
Unzulässigkeit eines schiedsrichterlichen Verfahrens gestellt werden.” [“Until the arbitral tribunal has 
been formed, a petition may be filed with the courts to have it determine the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of arbitration proceedings”.] Official translation, Code of Civil Procedure, 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html (last visted Feb. 26, 2019).) 
67 For all see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]1e civ. June 26, 2001, 
Bull. Civ. 1 No. 287 (Fr.) (Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Jules Verne et al., in which the French highest court, 
stating that the principle of validity of international arbitration agreements and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle are material rules of French international arbitration law; upholding that French courts cannot 
conduct a substantive, in-depth examination of the arbitration agreement. The exception is whenever the 
agreement is void or manifestly inapplicable); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 
(1995). In the positive law, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 16(1) (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.) (see 
first sentence). In the literature, CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 25; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 
23, at 61, 63 (distinguishing “Positive Kompetenz-Kompetenz” and “Negative Kompetenz-
Kompetenz”—being the latter only operable in cases where a challenge before a state court is filed at the 
outset of the dispute resolution); BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 52–53. Any further discussion about 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz falls well beyond the scope of the present research. For an accurate analysis at an 
international level see Barceló, supra note 58, at 1116, 1122 (et seq.). 
68 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 16(2) (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.); Barceló, supra note 
58, at 1115, 1118. 
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action in the courts of the seat with the purpose of enforcing or, on 
the contrary, setting aside an award, this is in accordance with 
Article 36(2)(b)(i) in conjunction with Article 6 of the Model Law, 
which takes into account the non-arbitrability policy as adopted by 
the law of the seat.69 If non-arbitrability arguments finally succeed, 
the award will be annulled and, in principle, deemed without effect 
worldwide.70 
On the other hand, during the proceedings aimed at recognizing 
and enforcing a foreign award elsewhere, non-arbitrability policies 
can either be raised as a defense by the award-debtor or even 
acknowledged ex officio by the judge. Conspicuously, the law of 
the seat is no longer relevant but the law of the jurisdiction where 
recognition and enforcement of the award is sought is. This is 
provided in the above-excerpted Article V(2)(a) of the New York 
Convention.71 
iii. A third, intermediate stage for control over arbitrability is available 
when a party seeks to plead in parallel proceedings in state courts. 
This is the case if national proceedings are commenced later than 
an international arbitration, which is thus not stayed.72 This 
scenario, however, should not occur often provided that state courts 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 The limited grounds for vacating and award include: “[t]he subject matter of the dispute was not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the state,” as set forth by UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
Article 34(2)(b)(i); see COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 58–59; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–
3. Cf. the grounds laid down in Eur. Convention on Int’l Comm. Arb. 1961, Article IX(1), as pointed out 
by LOUISE HAUBERG WILHELMSEN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION 137–38 (2018). 
70 Concerning the jurisdiction in which the award is to be set aside see Electric Corp. v. Bridas S.A. 
Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y 1990); in the literature, BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 109–10. 
Regarding cessation of the legal existence of an award as well as exceptional international recognition of 
annulled awards see HOF Amsterdam 28 Apr. 2009 (Yukos Capital/Rosneft) (Neth.); cf. BORN (2012), 
supra note 13, at 338–341. For the applicable law, see the discussion as follows. 
71 Haas, supra note 53, at 486–87 (making clear that the grounds for denial are exhaustive, thus a 
national law cannot provide for additional ones. However, the author considers the debate on whether 
state courts have discretion to apply them.); Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 60; COOK & GARCIA, 
supra note 12, at 59; Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Some Specific Issues about Arbitrability in Spain: 
Back to the Past?, LXV ANNALS OF THE FACULTY OF LAW IN BELGRADE, BELGRADE L. REV. 28, 31 
(2017); CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 27. 
72 See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 8(2); PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 78. The constellation 
of scenarios concerning parallel proceedings and jurisdictional issues, on grounds of arbitrability before 
the enforcement of an award, is further discussed in Section III.D.2.c, infra. 
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must refer parties to the IP arbitration proceedings upon petition by 
the defendant under Article II(3) of the New York Convention. 
Otherwise, parties assume a high risk of an inconsistent duplicity 
of rulings. Notwithstanding, when deciding on the referral, the state 
court may take into account non-arbitrability arguments.73 
Article II(3): 
[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect 
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, 
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it 
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. 
2. Multiplicity of Jurisdictions 
The traditional approach to arbitrability is almost exclusively focused 
on any control over agreements and resulting awards by courts of the seat. 
As argued in this research, this focus is incorrectly put, due to its exclusive 
character, not to its substantive importance. Intuitively, this so-called classic 
view can be explained, on the one hand because IP disputes are only in recent 
decades largely surpassing national borders. On the other hand, parties tend 
to agree on successful arbitration agreements drafted from a short-sighted 
standpoint. 
An example could be a practical note on factors that parties should 
consider when drafting an arbitration clause in a patent license agreement 
under U.S. law. Out of seven pages, only one paragraph at the very end 
addresses the international enforcement of a resulting award.74 
“Short-sighted” accommodates a basic assumption that market-players 
only have in mind the two threats posed by the chosen place of arbitration 
when drafting an arbitration clause for an IP contract. First, scrutiny over an 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 In tune with this, see UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 8(1) as adopted by Zivilprozessordnung 
[ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1032(1) (Ger.); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 58; CHROCZIEL 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 26–27, 91; Adamo, supra note 13, at 21. Cf. infra Section III.D.2.a.b (for post-
award revocation of rights and risk of contradicting inter-partes awards and erga omnes judgements). 
74 Jeffrey M. Prokop, Alex V. Chachkes & Jamie L. Shookman, Arbitration Clauses in Patent 
License Agreements, PRACTICAL LAW 7 (2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/cdn.orrick.com/files/ 
ArbitrationClausesinPatentLicenseAgreements.pdf. See Mantakou, supra note 22, at 271 (Stating: 
“[d]iversity of national systems with regard to arbitrability of IP disputes are factors which require the 
parties’ extreme caution in drafting arbitration clauses involving IP issues.”). 
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arbitration agreement on grounds of substantive and formal validity under 
the applicable contract law, together with any violation of the arbitrability 
notion enshrined by the mandatory laws on allocation of jurisdiction. Second, 
by the same token but down the way of the arbitral procedure, the risk of 
getting a final award vacated by the courts of, and in accordance with, the 
law of the seat. 
With the traditional approach, a third equivalent—if not far worse—
“far-sighted” threat result is seemingly disregarded.75 A central claim of this 
research is thus that closer attention must be paid to arbitrability review by 
state courts from the jurisdiction in which an arbitral award is ultimately 
sought to be recognized and enforced. This becomes of the utmost 
importance whenever an award-debtor does not voluntarily comply with the 
arbitral award. Adjectives “worse” and “far-sighted” are well justified by the 
following considerations: 
i. Not only do all jurisdictions but also all laws become relevant when 
adjudicating arbitrability. Regarding the former, although 
international arbitration is purportedly a centralized mechanism of 
dispute resolution globally, unity of proceedings is more than 
doubtful.76 Even if an award does not contravene non-arbitrability 
policies at the chosen place of arbitration, there is no guarantee for 
the award-creditor that due enforcement will be granted elsewhere. 
Furthermore, resorting to double exequatur is not possible either. 
In Europe, for example, the recast Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012 
of 12 December 2012 prevents litigants from enforcing a judgment 
that declares an international award enforceable in its country of 
origin instead of enforcing an award directly. In a nutshell: there is 
no default jurisdiction to adjudicate arbitrability.77 
                                                                                                                           
 
75 Grantham, supra note 24, at 193–94; De Werra, supra note 13, at 375. 
76 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2816–17 (2d ed. 2014) 
[hereinafter BORN (2014)]; BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 10–11; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–
3. 
77 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 27 (“[e]ven after an award has been rendered, the question 
of the arbitrability of IP issues may still arise.”). Beyond Europe, double exequatur relies on ever-growing 
treaties and multilateral conventions on international direct recognition of judgments. See Böckstiegel et 
al., supra note 59, at 48–49. 
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ii. As to the laws,78 a judge who knows about a litigant’s request for 
enforcement of an international award is to apply the domestic 
mandatory framework on allocation of jurisdiction. This is per 
Article V(2) of the New York Convention, whose paragraph (a) 
states “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country.” Perhaps 
even also under public policy considerations, per Article V(2)(b), 
non-enforcement will then occur because the state courts of the 
countries in which enforcement is sought apply a stricter policy on 
non-arbitrability than the one in the place of arbitration.79 
On top of that, parties’ choice-of-law and choice-of-seat clauses 
would already be futile at this stage of foreign recognition and 
enforcement. When concluding an arbitration clause, commercial 
parties may anticipate arbitrability outcomes by deciding on the 
substantive law and agreeing upon an arbitration-friendly seat, as 
provided by Article 20(1) of the Model Law.80 Courts of the state 
in which enforcement is later sought, however, will apply their own 
law. 
This opens an overwhelming, and not easily predictable, 
constellation of potential jurisdictions and corresponding laws to 
be considered when commercial parties are deciding whether and 
how to arbitrate future disputes. “Unpredictable” stands for the 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Beyond the specific discussion here, a single international commercial conflict may have vital 
connections with many different laws. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 13, at 3, 58 (Sorting out four laws 
as the relevant ones for any international arbitration: “[f]irst, the law that governs the international 
recognition and enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate. [Second] there is then the law—lex arbitri—
that governs the actual arbitration proceedings themselves. Next [third] there is the law or set of rules that 
the arbitral tribunal is required to apply to the substantive matters in dispute [either the underlying contract 
and/or the arbitration agreement itself]. Finally, [fourth] there is the law that governs the international 
recognition and enforcement of the award of the arbitral tribunal.”); and CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 5. It is also worth mentioning here the constellation of laws laid down in Article 61 of the WIPO 
Arbitration Rules. 
79 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 27; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 55, 59. 
80 This is another manifestation that a right choice of seat is key in international arbitration. BORN 
(2012), supra note 13, at 85, 105; TIBOR VÁRADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 124 (Tibor Várady et al. eds., 6th ed. 2015); Adamo, supra note 13, at 
23. As a rule, see Star Shipping AS v. China Nat’l Foreign Trade Trans. Corp. [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 445 
(UK) (about the linkage, on grounds of validity, between an express agreement as to the place of 
arbitration and an implied choice of a floating proper law). 
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following two reasons. Countries in which recognition and 
enforcement will ultimately be necessary are, first, not always 
anticipable at the time of entering into a contract. Enforcement 
elsewhere is often economically and legally crucial given the 
physical location of the defendant’s assets or registered office, 
factual location of the goods, third parties licensors, etc.81 Second, 
arbitrability polices on IP disputes are usually not clearly laid down 
and subject to changes of criteria, as proven by the comparative 
survey below. 
iii. State courts of the place where award-enforcement is sought may 
ex officio entertain the issue of non-arbitrability, as established in 
Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention.82 This is a key 
procedural trait with far-reaching strategic consequences worth 
taking into account when anticipating potential international 
litigation. It can well amount to a problem of asymmetric 
information in case one of the parties knowingly sitting in a 
jurisdiction where courts apply a stringent concept of non-
arbitrability. 
iv. Given the multiplicity of laws and jurisdictions subject to 
unpredictable changes in criteria based on national political or 
economic needs,83 there is legal uncertainty looming over 
commercial parties. If international awards are not recognized and 
enforced at the destination country, where it really matters for 
practical reasons, this results in micro- and macro economically 
devastating consequences.84 On top of that, this all happens after 
parties have endured a long and expensive international arbitration 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 8. 
82 E.g., Article V(2) New York Convention (As an illustrative example. “Recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that” in conjunction, for instance, with Zivilprozessordnung 
[ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1059(2)(2) (Ger.), which reads: (2) Ein Schiedsspruch kann nur 
aufgehoben werden, [. . .] 2. wenn das Gericht feststellt, dass [“An arbitration award may be reversed only 
if: [. . .] 2. The court determines that.”]). In the literature, Böckstiegel et al., supra note 59, at 43; 
CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 10; Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 31; Haas, supra note 53, at 486–87 
(presenting the discussion whether a state court has discretion). 
83 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 29–30, 33, 47. 
84 For the economic analysis of IP arbitrability, see the Section III.A (et seq.), infra. 
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proceeding. In initial stages of an arbitration procedure, a party 
may make tactical moves aimed at hampering the arbitration. 
However, at a post-award phase, non-enforcement transforms the 
conduct of proceedings into a full loss.85 This loss can only be seen 
as sunk cost for a party who needs to start state-court proceedings 
anew in the country where enforcement was sought. 
As a rule of thumb, legal systems worldwide resort to similar rationales to 
justify limitations to commercial arbitration on grounds of non-arbitrability. 
Namely, affectation of mandatory rules enshrining public policies or interest, 
violation of exclusive competence of state courts, or negative impact on 
unrelated third parties.86 In the following sections, they are narrowed down 
to IP arbitrability as discussed in this research. 
3. Arguments for Non-Arbitrability of IP Validity 
The first argument,87 labeled subjective, refers to the parties involved. 
Exploitation disputes are, most of the time, between two or more parties 
bound by a business transaction. The relevant institutions supporting the 
transaction are contract law and its enforcement by courts or arbitral 
tribunals. This entails liability rules with inter-partes effect. 
In stark contrast, IP rights are exclusionary rights, supported by statutory 
IP provisions and enforced by the competent register and/or courts.88 This 
entails property rules with erga omnes effect. International IP disputes over 
contractual or tort issues in which the respondent asserts an invalidity defense 
combine both. As a consequence, there is the possibility that a decision 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 56 (Stating: “[w]ithout state consent to arbitrate the 
claims, there is no enforceability of the outcome. Without enforceability, the efforts and expense of 
obtaining an arbitral award may prove largely futile.”). 
86 Blessing, supra note 54, at 27; Fortier, supra note 65, at 269–70; Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 
32, 39 (classifies non-arbitrability arguments in: (1) arbitrability rationae materiae, (2) subjective 
arbitrability (authority, capacity), and pointing out that some authors acknowledge a third category of 
arguments known as (3) rationae jurisdictionis (or institutionis)). 
87 Smith, supra note 42, at 306–13 (distinguishing between legal arguments (those presenting some 
obstacle to arbitrability) and policy ones (addressing the advisability of keeping non-arbitrability 
obstacles)). 
88 Mantakou, supra note 22, at 268; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 59; COOK & GARCIA, 
supra note 12, at 68–69, 71–72; Smith et al., supra note 42, at 306–07; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 14. 
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rendered by a private dispute resolution body negatively affects third parties, 
given erga omnes effect conferred to IP rights.89 Third parties are, in 
principle, unrelated to the dispute and most of the time are very difficult to 
determine. Whereas an arbitrator has no authority over third parties,90 it 
remains questionable whether an arbitral award can serve as a title for 
amending the public register.91 Likewise, the same questions arise as regards 
the arbitrability of registered real property and of certain corporate disputes, 
as seen below.92 
On the flip side, it is not necessarily true that only a decision registered 
with erga omnes effect could actually serve the interests of a litigant asserting 
IP (in)validity, while preserving legal certainty for third parties. As discussed 
below, it may be in the very interest of a party to merely have inter-partes 
effect. One party is not willing to incur IP litigation for the benefit of its 
competitors; the other is not taking the risk of losing an exclusionary right 
for a minor contractual or infringement lawsuit. In both scenarios, the IP right 
deemed “invalidated” by the arbitral tribunal does not cease to exist as 
regards third parties but the claim in contracts or torts is solved between the 
parties.93 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 7–8 (“[t]he value of an IPR lies in the fact that, unlike a 
contractual obligation, it is effective against all persons and organizations in the particular country in 
which it subsists.”). 
90 Smith et al., supra note 42, at 307; Grantham, supra note 24, at 220. 
91 See below the third argument and Section III.D.2.b, infra. Böckstiegel et al., supra note 59, at 
23–24; Christian Seiler, Kommentar zur Schiedsfähigkeit § 1030 ZPO, in ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (ZPO) 
1420 (Heinz Thomas & Hans Putzo eds., 39th ed. 2018); Mantakou, supra note 22, at 267–68; COOK & 
GARCIA, supra note 12, at 35; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 15. This is totally consistent with the 
economics of arbitration as analyzed by Shavell, supra note 38, at 45 who identifies two limits: “[f]irst, it 
may be that a party to an agreement was not properly informed about the relevant information—[. . .] 
character of ADR. Second, it may be that an agreement to use ADR would negatively affect third parties” 
(emphasis added). Finally, COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 7 point out that some infringements of IP 
rights can be considered as crimes under Article 61 TRIPs. These are generally cases of piracy and 
counterfeiting. 
92 See below the jurisdiction argument as to arbitrability of real property disputes. For corporate 
disputes see Christian Duve & Philip Wimalasena, Part IV: Selected Areas and Issues of Arbitration in 
Germany, Arbitration of Corporate Law Disputes in Germany, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE 
MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 927, 930, 960 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento 
eds., 2d ed. 2015). In Germany, for instance, an award declaring the validity or nulitiy of shareholders’ 
resolutions can only be entered into the commercial register upon declaration of enforceability by a state 
court under § 1060 ZPO. 
93 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 71; see Sections III.B.4 and III.D.2.b, infra. 
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The second argument, substantive, addresses the disputed matter. 
Lawsuits of IP exploitation largely concern claims of an economic nature or 
issues disposable by parties under the watch of applicable mandatory laws.94 
Nevertheless, IP disputes also dangerously involve moral aspects95 and/or 
matters of public interest. Both are considered to be better protected with 
mandatory rules enforced by state courts than by self-selected tribunals.96 
This becomes clear when questioning the ownership or validity of patents, 
utility models, registered designs, or trademarks in the course of international 
commercial litigation. Each IP right creates, in essence, a geographically 
limited temporal monopoly over a valuable immaterial asset. They have a 
market-organizing function that attempts, in a controlled fashion, against one 
of the very basic public interests: market competition.97 
The material argument against arbitrability on the subject matter is, 
therefore, intertwined with public policy considerations, which explains a not 
always clear application of paragraphs (a) or (b) of Article V(2) of the New 
York Convention.98 On top of that, mandatory norms that encapsulate social 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 Cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] Article 2059 (Fr.) (“Toutes personnes peuvent 
compromettre sur les droits dont elles ont la libre disposition.” [“All persons may make arbitration 
agreements relating to rights of which they have the free disposal.”] Official translation at, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681); in line with Arbitration Act Article 2(1) 
(60 2003) (Spain), and Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1030(1) (Ger.); 
Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 29; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 265; Erik Schäfer, Part IV: Selected Areas 
and Issues of Arbitration in Germany, Arbitration of Intellectual Property Related Disputes in Germany, 
in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 907, 909 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan 
Michael Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
95 This is commonly the case for copyrights as stressed by Mantakou, supra note 22, at 266, who 
also points out the linkage between moral rights of authors and their personality, honor and dignity. 
96 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 74; Blessing, supra note 54, at 24; De Miguel Asensio, 
supra note 13, at 83, 94 (concluding that, by the same token, the imposition of compulsory licenses should 
not be arbitrable). 
97 PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, at 4, 29–30; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 6–8, 15, 64; 
CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 95; Carroll, supra note 22, at 16; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, 
at 67, 83 (“IP has deep connections to competition law and because of the exclusionary nature of IP, its 
improper use often carries antitrust concerns with it.”). See also Miriam Martínez Pérez, Patent Law 
versus Competition Law in the European Union: A Complementary Relationship?, 10 CUADERNOS DE 
DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 372, 381–82 (2018) (distinguishing between a legal and an economic 
monopoly when it comes to industrial IP rights). 
98 De Werra, supra note 13, at 373; Haas, supra note 53, at 519–20; Grantham, supra note 24, at 
179, 220; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 50, 64–65, 67 (stating: “[a]rbitrability and public policy 
constitute inextricable issues” (emphasis added); however, the authors also stress that it is not accurate 
solving non-arbitrability with public policy arguments). 
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and economic policies are extremely variate across jurisdictions.99 In 
principle, private resolution of disputes over industrial registered IP rights 
does not per se violate mandatory rules in many countries.100 Arbitrators are 
under the duty to enforce imperative laws between the parties, which also 
explains an acceptance of the inter-partes effect of international awards.101 
Something different is, however, that private parties in self-selected 
commercial arbitral tribunals negatively impact third parties and affect public 
interests, like market competition, without the intervention of public state-
authorities.102 This explains both the grounds for vacation of awards at the 
seat and for denial of enforcement under Article V(2) of the New York 
Convention elsewhere. 
This is the case both in the European Union and in the United States of 
America. The notion of public policy, against which arbitral awards are 
scrutinized, includes competition law concerns, even when the topics are 
considered to be arbitrable.103 In the E.U., the decision in Eco Swiss China 
Time Ltd. v. Benetton International, establishes that national courts are to set 
aside an award, on grounds of public policy, that contravenes Article 101 
                                                                                                                           
 
99 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Swiss Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 2006, 4P_278/2006, 132 ATF III 
389 (Switz.) (Where the Swiss high court ruled in, Tensacciai SPA v. Freyssinet Terra Armata SRL, 
regarding enforcement of awards, that antitrust law is not part of public policy. This of course reduces the 
risk of annulments for awards made in this international arbitration-friendly seat.); CHROCZIEL ET AL., 
supra 3, at 95, 127. Interestingly, in France, the notion of international public policy evokes to a more 
restrictive standard for setting aside an award on grounds of public policy; see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, civ., Mar. 23, 2006, 04/19673 (Fr.) (SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV (confirmed 
by the Cour de Cassation in 2008)). 
Beyond this discussion on arbitrability and competition law, any attempt to further elaborate on the 
notion of public policy in arbitration is far from the purpose of this work. Further references on spillovers 
between IP rights and competition law under the auspices of international commercial arbitration can be 
found in CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 123–27. For the notion of public policy pursuant to Article 
V(2)(a) New York Convention see Haas, supra note 53, at 520–25 (article commentary). 
100 Blessing, supra note 54, at 24–27; Grantham, supra note 24, at 182. 
101 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639 n.21; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 62; 
PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 133–34; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 123; Viscasillas, supra note 71, 
at 45. 
102 An example could be Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) discussed in Section III.D.2.a, 
infra. 
103 As to validity of arbitration clauses, the conclusions of the Advocate General, Niilo Jääskinen, 
in Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Akzo Nobel NV, 2015 E.C.R. (point 
that was finally not addressed by the CJEU on 21 May 2015, c-352/13), when interpreting Article 101 
TFEU, questioned it to the extent that an arbitration clause assumes jurisdiction on antitrust claims without 
a party being aware of it. 
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TFEU. In the United States, the relevant decision is Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., in which the arbitrability of antitrust claims 
was accepted, subject to ultimate state courts’ review at the enforcement 
stage. 
This was alleged, but finally denied by the CJEU, in Genentech Inc. v. 
Hoechst GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH c-567/14, of 7 July 
2016. Genentech sought to set aside an award dealing with payment of 
royalties under a patent licensing contract before the Paris Cour d’Appel on 
grounds of violation of EU competition law. Genentech’s argument was that 
a tribunal’s order on payment of royalties for a deemed invalid patent places 
the licensee on a clear competitive disadvantage.104 
The third argument refers to jurisdiction, being a direct consequence of 
the other two arguments above. International arbitration is a creature of 
contract and parties therefore agree on subjecting economic and disposable 
IP matters to the jurisdiction of a private authority. But when the underlying 
IP rights are conferred (i.e. created) upon a public examination that applied 
formal and substantive statutory criteria, it is argued that only the public 
authority should be competent to modify the decision, to make an amendment 
to the public register on grounds of non-existence or invalidity.105 Thus, the 
very nature of the property protected explains why arbitrability of real 
property disputes is, in comparison, more accepted. While a successful 
validity challenge against an IP right eliminates the intangible property, the 
land does not disappear. Only the entitlement of a person to the land is 
modified. An award with such effect can thus more easily enter into the 
public register under the watch of the competent court or authority.106 
To sum up, given either public policy implications or the nature of the 
IP rights, some IP disputes should fall into the exclusive jurisdiction of 
governmental agencies, public registers and state courts. Possibly, expertise 
                                                                                                                           
 
104 See infra Section III.D.2 (on post-award confirmation or revocation of IP rights asserted during 
arbitration); CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra 3, at 94, 97, 125–28. 
105 Grantham, supra note 24, at 184–86; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 59, 67 (Formulating 
the idea that the state is “[b]oth gatekeeper and grantor of the registered IP rights.”); De Miguel Asensio, 
supra note 13, at 87; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 15; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 64–65. 
Cf. with the Belgian and Swiss approaches discussed in Section II.C.3.a, infra, and whether an award 
could be a title to amend the register in Section III.D.2.b, infra. 
106 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 69–70 n.83. 
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is not the rationale behind this per se non-arbitrability.107 Arbitral tribunals 
are generally highly qualified to decide on complex IP issues. It is rather a 
question of state sovereignty: a self-selected mechanism for dispute 
resolution must not distort acts of state.108 
Two additional remarks speak for this argument on jurisdiction. On the 
one hand, even though international arbitration is not always confidential, it 
is surely private. At all events, these traits pose concerns as to whether full 
record of the proceedings should be kept when dealing with registered IP 
rights. Also, whether unrelated third parties should have knowledge of the 
dispute or even be able to take part in it.109 On the other hand, entries in 
records of public registers largely enjoy a presumption of validity. Arguably, 
this presumption can only be removed by an act of state and not by a privately 
rendered award. 
4. Legal Comparative Survey 
Against a comparative background, national policies on non-
arbitrability prove to be highly controversial. First, the limits of the notion 
might be obscure, resulting in little predictability, as illustrated by comparing 
the Spanish and United States’ frameworks for international IP arbitration. 
Second, if clear, they are heterogeneous and subject to changes in the criteria. 
In either case, it is the result of an overlap between the territoriality of IP law 
and, to some extent, the lack of a uniform international arbitration 
framework.110 The UNCITRAL Model Law intended to remedy that by 
                                                                                                                           
 
107 See Mantakou, supra note 22, at 268 (coining this concept). 
108 It also relates to the territoriality of IP law, as explained by PILA & TORREMANS, supra note 12, 
at 29–30. Smith et al., supra note 42, at 306; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 68 (considering: 
“[n]ot surprisingly, these roles have historically driven national resistance to arbitration of IP claims.”); 
COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 63. 
109 For the informative function of IP litigation as positive externality see Section III.D.3, infra. 
Smith et al., supra note 42, at 315–17 (Stating: “[c]onfidentiality and recordkeeping can also be 
problematic for states that wish to subject the potential public policy issues of [IP] patent arbitration to 
more scrutiny”; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 74. As to the controversial trait of confidentiality 
of international arbitration see BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 2781 (clearly distinguishing between 
privacy (“only parties to the arbitration agreement—and not third parties—may attend arbitral hearings 
and participate in the arbitral proceedings”) and confidentiality (“obligations not to disclose information 
concerning the arbitration to third parties”)). 
110 PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 118. 
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setting forth a set of rules upon which national arbitration laws could have 
been consistently modeled.111 
a. Three General Categories 
Absolute Non-Arbitrability 
The patent law of the People´s Republic of China, in conjunction with 
its Arbitration Act, jointly curbs the arbitrability of IP validity defenses. 
China, perhaps together with South Africa, is the largest representative of 
absolute non-arbitrability worldwide. Consequently, if an invalidity defense 
of an IP right is raised in the course of a contractual or infringement 
international lawsuit, Chinese and South African laws will cease arbitral 
jurisdiction in favor of the state authorities.112 This is not a minor finding, 
given the worldwide role played by China as goods manufacturer. Section 
18(1) of the South African Patent Act of 1978 reads as follows: “[s]ave as is 
otherwise provided in this Act, no tribunal other than the commissioner shall 
have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and decide any proceedings, 
other than criminal proceedings, relating to any matter under this Act.”113 
Some of the common law leading economies, such as the United 
Kingdom or Singapore, provide for a relative arbitrability of registered 
intellectual property rights with limited inter-partes effect. This mostly 
encompasses patents and trademarks.114 Notably, both jurisdictions are seen 
as being international arbitration-friendly worldwide.115 Canada seems to 
also share this approach, it allows arbitrability of IP disputes with the limited 
effects inter-partes. This view is primarily derived from the landmark 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 29–30 (pointing out that neither the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, 
nor its revision in 2006 set forth a model rule on arbitrability. Furthermore, she refers to the official 
records, during which it was stated that: “[t]he prevailing opinion was that the Model Law should not 
contain a provision delimiting non-arbitrable issues” (A/CN.9/216, 23 Mar. 1982, No. 30), http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V82/252/94/PDF/V8225294.pdf?OpenElement.). 
112 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 51; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 20; Grantham, supra 
note 24, at 204. 
113 Patent Act 57 of 1978 § 18.1 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
114 Patents Act 1977, 37, § 52(5) (Eng.) (as amended in 2014) (establishes that full arbitrability of 
patents is, however, only allowed under the sanction of the state courts); Singapore Patents Act Sec. 58(6) 
(establishes that the whole or part of the proceedings—including questions of validity (para. 3)—can be 
referred to arbitration); for both see CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 20–21, 23. 
115 Nottage, supra note 13, at 65. 
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decision Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette, which interpreted the Code of 
Civil Procedure of Québec in favor of a liberal understanding of the subject 
matters over which an arbitration agreement can extend.116 
As demonstrated by Spain, inter-partes arbitrability of validity claims 
concerning registered industrial IP rights is nowadays increasingly adopted 
by continental civil law jurisdictions. In France, as also explained below, the 
decision of the Cour d’Appel Paris on the matter between Liv Hidravlika 
D.O.O. v. Diebolt, S.A., confirmed an award incidentally deciding on the 
validity of the industrial property right at stake.117 The tendency in Germany 
also shifted from the early Interim Award (1989) in the ICC case no. 6097, 
ICC Bulletin vol. 4, issue 2 (1993); however, guiding case law on the topic 
is still missing.118 Recent scholarly opinions also seem to be in favor of the 
arbitrability with limited inter-partes effect. Notwithstanding that, there are 
ongoing discussions about the interpretation of § 1030 ZPO in conjunction 
with §§ 27, 61, 65, 73 PatG (Patent Act), which confer jurisdiction over 
validity issues to the German Patent and Trade Mark Office, and to the 
Bundespatentgericht (the Federal Patent Court). 
In other civil law countries, the approach to arbitrability is even more 
disputed. According to the definition of “a claim involving economic interest 
falling within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts” laid down in § 582 of 
the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, it is argued that validity defenses 
concerning IP rights fall outside of allowed arbitrability.119 Reaching the 
same result, arts. 80–81 of the Dutch Patent Law 1995 (as amended in 2008) 
exclude arbitration by giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court of 
The Hague over patent validity and infringement issues.120 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette [2003] S.C.R. 178 (Can.); Fortier, supra note 65, at 279–81, 
284; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
117 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Feb. 28, 2008, 05/10577 (Fr.); Edouard 
Fortunet, Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes in France, 26 ARB. INT’L 281, 293–94 (2010); 
CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 21; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 270; see below Section III.D.1, infra. 
118 Seiler, supra note 91, at 1420, para. 6 (stating: “der Parteidisposition entzogene Streitigkeiten 
[. . .] wie Nichtigerklärung oder Zurücknahme von Patenten, zumal diese Entscheidungen für und gegen 
jedermann wirken” (Author’s translation: disposition of conflicts by the parties [. . .] such as the 
annulment or withdrawal of patents, especially as these decisions are effective for and against anyone)); 
Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 93; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 21–22; Schäfer, supra note 
94, at 915. For the opposing view cf. Münch, supra note 53, at 33; Adamo, supra note 13, at 16. 
119 See CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 19 (for an interpretation of § 582 Ö. ZPO). 
120 Smith et al., supra note 42, at 339 (“[s]ubstantive patent law issues do not appear to be arbitrable 
in the Netherlands.”). These provisions are, however, subject to conflicting interpretations, cf. Patent Act 
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Beyond national legal systems, further concerns on disruptive non-
arbitrability policies are raised by bodies of supranational law, in Europe, by 
the Unified Patent Package. This new body of law includes an international 
agreement aimed at establishing a Unified Patent Court.121 As laid down in 
its Article 1,122 it has competence to unitarily adjudicate disputes as regards 
the newly created Europe-wide IP right (EU Unitary Patent)123 and other 
existing European patents. In addition, the EU-UPC Agreement inaugurates 
a specific arbitral institution to adjudicate contractual and infringement 
lawsuits. In particular, the controversy as to arbitrability is raised by Article 
32(1) of the UPC Agreement, which establishes that the Unified Patent Court 
will be the exclusive competent tribunal to decide on the validity of disputes 
concerning IP rights: “Article 32. Competence of the Court; 1) The Court 
shall have exclusive competence in respect of: [. . .] (d) actions for revocation 
of patents and for declaration of invalidity of supplementary protection 
certificates; (e) counterclaims for revocation of patents and for declaration of 
invalidity of supplementary protection certificates . . . .”124 
The problem, again, is to what extent a validity issue raised as a defense 
in the course of a contractual lawsuit over an IP right listed in Article 1 of the 
UPC Agreement can be incidentally adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal. On 
top of that, whether an award will be later inter-partes enforced by the state 
courts of the EU member states. Award enforcement may be disputed, 
assumedly on grounds of non-arbitrability, if one follows the argumentation 
of decision CJEU of 13 July 2006 case C-4/03 GAT. In it, the CJEU 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 of 1978 § 18(1) (S. Afr.) (as amended in 2002). For all, see again CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 
22–23. 
121 Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1 (EU) [hereinafter UPC-
Agreement]. Further information is, European Patent Court, United Patent Court, EPO.ORG., https:// 
www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/upc.html#tab1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
122 Tevor Cook, Update on the Unitary Patent Court and the European Patent with Unitary Effect, 
20 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 185, 186 (2015); De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 96 (discussing the purpose 
of the EU UPC Agreement: “[t]ribunal común para todos los Estados miembros contratantes” (author’s 
translation: a common court for all contracting members) stressing that Spain is not part); see Schäfer, 
supra note 94, at 915; and CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra 3, at 1–2 (discussing that UPC’s arbitration and 
mediation center will be a structural element of the new European dispute resolution system). 
123 The Unitary Patent Court Agreement consists of two EU regulations: Regulation 1257, 2012 
O.J. (L 361) 1 (EU); Regulation 1260, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 1 (EU). 
124 UPC-Agreement, supra note 121, Article 32(1). 
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interpreted Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention of 27 Sept. 1968125 as 
meaning that “[a]ll proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a 
patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a 
plea in objection” fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. 
Scholars now consider otherwise, leaving practitioners with unpredictable 
outcomes.126 
The Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 “Brussels I 
Regulation” (O.J. L 12/1, 16 Jan. 2001, entered into force in Mar. 2002) and, 
later, its subsequent recast Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012 
(O.J. L 351/1, 20 Dec. 2012, entered into force in Jan. 2013) superseded for 
many EU member states the former 1968 Convention. Arts. 22(2) and 24(4), 
respectively, lay down the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, regardless of 
domicile “[i]n proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of 
patents, trademarks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited 
or registered [. . .].” Furthermore, recital 34 of the Recast Regulation 
1215/2012 clearly provides for continuity between the three instruments and 
particularly stresses “[t]he same need for continuity applies as regards the 
interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of the 
1968 Brussels Convention and of the Regulations replacing it.”127 
Absolute Arbitrability 
The third group of cases is placed at the opposite side of the spectrum. 
Arts. 51(1) and 73(6) of the Belgian Patent Act establish the full positive 
arbitrability of validity disputes by deeming an arbitral award res judicata 
(chose jugée), capable of being registered with erga omnes effect. In 
Belgium, the process of becoming res judicata is, however, subject to the 
opposition right of third parties. Unfortunately, as regards trademarks, the 
Belgian law does not clarify the question of arbitrability. The first of the 
above provisions reads: 
                                                                                                                           
 
125 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 1972 O.J. (L 299). 
126 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 69; Schäfer, supra note 94, at 915 (“[a]t the same time, 
the wording chosen indicates that a decision declaring with effect inter-partes that a Unitary Patent is 
fully or partially invalid, or a decision that implicitly deals with this type of issue as question precedent, 
is likely to fall within the competence of an arbitral tribunal. Future case law will tell.” (Emphasis added)). 
127 For decisions of the CJEU on the topic see HAUBERG WILHELMSEN, supra note 69, at 4–6. 
2019] ECONOMICS OF ARBITRABILITY 217 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.164 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
§ 51(1) Lorsqu’un brevet est annulé, en totalité ou en partie, par un jugement ou 
un arrêt ou par une sentence arbitrale, la décision d’annulation a contre tous 
l’autorité de la chose jugée sous réserve de la tierce opposition. Les décisions 
d’annulation passées en force de chose jugée sont inscrites au Registre. (Emphasis 
added).128 
Switzerland is another jurisdiction that upholds a positive arbitrability 
policy on invalidity claims over registered IP rights, corresponding with a 
pro-arbitration seat internationally recognized.129 After the decision of the 
Institut fédéral de la propriété intellectuelle on 15 December 1975 PMMB1 
1976 I S.9E,130 an arbitral award can be the basis for entries in the register 
and therefore serve to cancel a patent right with erga omnes effect. However, 
such effect is subject to state courts’ control, since awards must be 
accompanied by a certificate of enforceability issued by the Swiss court at 
the seat of the arbitral tribunal. The distinction must be noticed: erga omnes 
effect is conferred upon registration, not to the award itself.131 The dispositive 
part of this landmark decision reads: 
4. [. . .] dass Schiedsgerichte befugt sind, über die Gültigkeit gewerblicher 
Schutzrechte zu entscheiden. Demgemäß vollzieht das Amt in den bei ihm 
geführten Registern Schiedssprüche über die Gültigkeit gewerblicher 
Schutzrechte, wenn sie mit einer Article 44 des Konkordats über die 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit entsprechenden Vollstreckbarkeitsbescheinigung 
versehen sind.132 
                                                                                                                           
 
128 Loi sur les brevets d’invention [Patent Law] of Mar. 27, 1984, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium] § 51(1) (revised 2008) (Author’s translation: “[w]hen a patent is annulled, 
in whole or in part, by a judgment or an arbitral award, the decision to annul is res judicata against 
anyone, subject to third party opposition. Decisions on annulments that have become res judicata are 
entered in the Register” (emphasis added)); CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 19; COOK & GARCIA, 
supra note 12, at 51. 
129 NIKLAUS MEIER & BERNHARD STEHLE, IPR–PRÜFSCHEMEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
UND ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT DER SCHWEIZ 422–23 (2018) (for a schematic presentation of the subject 
matters accepted to be arbitrable in international proceedings); Ramon Mabillard & Robert Briner, Article 
177 IPRG, in BASLER KOMMENTAR—INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (IPRG) para. 9 (Honsell et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2013). 
130 Swiss Trademark Law Decisions, DECISIONS.CH, http://www.decisions.ch/smi.html (Auskunft 
des Amtes nach Konsultation der eidgenössischen Justizabteilung [information from the Office after 
consultation with the Federal Department of Justice], see 1976, at 37–38); see also Mabillard & Briner, 
supra note 129, at para. 15. 
131 Grantham, supra note 24, at 211; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 51; CHROCZIEL ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 24; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 83; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 267. 
132 Author’s Translation: 
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In conclusion, it is undisputed that the lack of default jurisdiction (and 
law) for adjudicating on arbitrability reveals itself to be particularly 
jeopardized whenever arbitrators decide on invalidity defenses of registered 
industrial IP rights raised during international contractual or tortious 
lawsuits. For example, a patent registered in Switzerland, Spain, Germany 
and South Africa can be fully invalidated by an arbitral tribunal in the first, 
whereas in the other two, the decision would only be enforced, at best, with 
inter-partes effect. Finally, in the last, enforcement would be rejected.133 
Beyond the heterogeneous approaches identified by the systems 
surveyed above, the present research focuses on a further peril: the vagueness 
of legal systems as regards inter-partes arbitrability. The discussion is based 
on a bottom-up review of two arbitration frameworks in order to better 
exemplify the problem. It also illustrates the effort that, in practice, potential 
parties to an arbitration must undertake when thinking of it as a dispute 
mechanism.134 
b. Spanish Law: Undefined inter-partes Arbitrability 
The Spanish Act 60/2003 on Arbitration (B.O.E. 2003, 309), of 
26 December (hereinafter LA), as amended by Act 11/2011,135 governs the 
arbitral proceedings, recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in 
                                                                                                                           
 
[. . .] therefore that arbitral tribunals are empowered to decide on the validity of industrial 
property rights. Accordingly, the Office will enforce arbitral awards on the validity of 
industrial property rights in its registers if they are accompanied by a certificate of 
enforceability corresponding to Article 44 of the Concordat on Arbitration. 
133 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 123. 
134 Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 71, 75 (highlighting: “[a]s a result of this lack of 
worldwide consistency, claimants in IP Disputes will need to use careful analysis to ensure the objective 
arbitrability of their claims as a preliminary step to proceeding with arbitration. This requires that parties 
become familiar with the public policies of the arbitration situs as well as that of each country in which it 
is anticipated that enforcement of the award will be required [. . .]” (Emphasis added)). See also 
Mantakou, supra note 22, at 271. 
135 Act 60/2003 of 23 Dec. on Arbitration (B.O.E. 2003, 309) (Spain); Ministerio de Justicia, Act 
60/2003 of 23 Dec. on Arbitration, Official English Translation, https://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/ 
Satellite/Portal/1292426982249?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-
Disposition&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DAct_on_arbitration_%28Ley_60_2003_
_de_arbitraje%29.PDF (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). Jointly with the new arbitration law, it is noticeable 
that Spain has signed more than 50 BITs, most incorporating arbitration clauses, and also ratified the 1958 
New York, 1927 Geneva, and 1965 Washington conventions; Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 33–35. 
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Spain.136 Whether an arbitration is deemed international or not, however, 
must not be confused with the domestic or international character of an 
award.137 The law, largely modeled on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, 
adopts a monist system unifying international and domestic arbitration. It 
keeps a few necessary, special rules addressing aspects of international 
disputes.138 Furthermore, as established in Article 1(3), the LA adopts a 
default position yielding priority to other specific types of arbitration 
provided in particular legislations.139 
Despite legislative competences conferred to its seventeen Autonomous 
Regions (Comunidades Autónomas), the Arbitration law is unitary for the 
entire Spanish jurisdiction. It was enacted by virtue of Central State’s 
exclusive competence in civil, mercantile and procedure laws per arts. 
149.1.6 and 8.a Spanish Constitution. Beyond the substantive ground, a 
policy explanation for this is that a purpose of the LA was to attract 
international arbitration by presenting Spain as an attractive seat. 
Accordingly, a unique framework provides certainty to international 
players.140 
The arbitrability policy under Spanish law corresponds with the French 
approach. Arts. 2(1) and 41(1)(e) of the LA address issues of validity of 
arbitration agreements and award annulment, both designating Spain as the 
seat of arbitration. Parties can arbitrate to the extent they can validly dispose 
or settle on a given subject matter. The limits to that are raised by public 
                                                                                                                           
 
136 In many procedural matters, the LA should be read in conjunction with the Law of Civil 
Procedure L.E.Civ. 1/2000 of 7 Jan., BOE No. 7, of 8 Jan. 2000 (Spain). 
137 Article 46 LA defines the “foreign status” of an award whenever “it is delivered outside Spain.” 
138 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 34 (noting that Article 3 LA defines “international arbitration” 
very broadly and flexibly. One of the rules applying exclusively to international arbitration is, as discussed 
below, Article 9(6) LA on validity of the agreement to arbitrate.). 
139 Ana Montesinos García, El Arbitraje en Materia de Propiedad Intelectual, 1 RIEDPA: REVISTA 
INTERNACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 1, 8 (2013) (focusing on the arbitral 
proceedings set forth in the Intellectual Property Act (Copyright)). Act 21/2014 of 4 Nov. (B.O.E. 2014, 
268) (amending the Intellectual Property Act approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996, of 12 Apr. 
and the Law of Civil Procedure 1/2000, of 7 Jan.). 
140 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 33–35. Pablo Martínez-Gijón Machuca, La Doctrina del Tribunal 
Constitucional en materia de arbitraje, 31 REVISTA ARANZADI DE DERECHO PATRIMONIAL 189, 192–93 
(2013) (Upholding, at least from a constitutional viewpoint, that arbitration is regarded in Spain as a 
jurisdictional equivalent to state-court civil procedure.). 
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interest as enshrined by mandatory rules.141 One of these is labor disputes, 
expressly excluded by Article 1(4) of the LA and accordingly interpreted by 
the case law.142 Article 34(2) of the LA rules on the applicable substantive 
law for deciding on the merits. Together with Article 9(6), they set a 
particular rule favoring arbitrability for international proceedings: 
Article 9. Form and content of the arbitration agreement 
[. . .] 
6. In international arbitration, the arbitration agreement will be valid and the 
dispute arbitrable if the requirements laid down in any of the following are 
met: the legal rules chosen by the parties to govern the agreement; the rules 
applicable to the substance of the dispute; or the rules laid down in Spanish 
law.143 (Emphasis added). 
Accordingly, parties can validly incorporate a choice-of-law clause that 
allows arbitrability of IP validity defenses. In principle, this agreement will 
be respected if an international arbitration is seated in Spain, regardless of 
whether it would be otherwise possible under Spanish law. Notwithstanding 
that, a decision of T.S.J. Madrid, Nov. 3, 2015 (No. 79) has somehow 
contradicted the favour arbitris principle enshrined by this provision.144 
Although deciding on a different type of conflict, the Superior Court of 
Madrid upheld that state courts are entitled to review the facts and the law 
applied by an arbitral tribunal to determine arbitrability. Particularly, to the 
extent that the subject matter of the dispute could affect public policy. 
Spillovers between arbitrability and public policy arguments become evident 
again.145 In stark contrast, for exequaturs of international awards in Spain, 
Article. 46(2) of the LA sets forth a direct remission to the Convention or, if 
applicable, to other more favorable texts.146 In accordance with Article 
                                                                                                                           
 
141 Cf. Code Civil [C. Civ] [Civil Code] Article 2059 (Fr.) (excerpted above); see De Miguel 
Asensio, supra note 13, at 88 for a parallel example of arbitrability in cases of applicable mandatory 
antitrust rules; García, supra note 139, at 11. 
142 T.S.J. Cataluñya, Feb. 4, 2016 (No. 6/2016) (Spain) (The decision of T.S.J. Cataluñya, it was 
controversial the nature of a non-compete clause incorporated at a sales contract for the purpose of 
applying the LA.). 
143 Arbitration Act (B.O.E. 2003, 60) (Spain). 
144 T.S.J. Madrid, Nov. 3, 2015 (No. 79/2016) (Spain). 
145 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 41–42. 
146 Arbitration Act (B.O.E. 2003, 60) (Spain). 
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V(2)(a)(b), the Spanish legal framework is thus only relevant when it comes 
to enforcement of awards incidentally adjudicating on IP validity.147 
All in all, the notion of IP arbitrability in Spain also results from the 
overlap of arbitration rules with applicable IP laws. This research concerns 
Law 24/2015 on patents (including utility models in its thirteenth title);148 
Law 17/2001 on trademarks;149 and Law 20/2003 on industrial designs.150 
The latter two do not refer to arbitration in IP litigation but provide this ADR 
mechanism for solving registration controversies, which, surprisingly, have 
a rather administrative character. As to the former, Article 136(1) of the 
Patent Law lays down IP arbitrability in contractual and infringement 
lawsuits.151 Notwithstanding that, paragraph (2) further defines the notion of 
“free choice matters” contained in Article 2(1) of the Act 60/2003 by 
expressly excluding patent validity from arbitration: 
2. No son de libre disposición, y quedan excluidas de la mediación o el arbitraje, 
las cuestiones relativas a los procedimientos de concesión, oposición o recursos 
referentes a los títulos regulados en esta Ley, cuando el objeto de la controversia 
sea el cumplimiento de los requisitos exigidos para su concesión, su 
mantenimiento o su validez. 152 
Whereas the wording of Article 136(2) (first sentence) is clearly 
exclusionary, it is nowadays admitted by scholars that validity is incidentally 
arbitrable in Spain and enforced with inter-partes effect, mainly for the 
purpose of solving contractual or infringement lawsuits.153 This results from 
                                                                                                                           
 
147 In the case law, e.g., the S.A.P. Alicante, July 23, 2012 (no. 345) (Spain) (SAP A 2198/2012 
enforced an ICC award on infringement of a communitarian trademark under the auspices of Article 46 
LA). Among the scholars, De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 95. 
148 BOE 2001, 924 (Spain). See Eduardo Galán Corona, Ley 24/2015, de 24 de julio, de Patentes: 
BOE nº 177, de 25-VIIi2015, 4 CRÓNICA DE LEGISLACIÓN—ARS IURIS SALAMANTICENSIS 296, 298–99 
(2016); Pérez, supra note 97, at 372, 383–84 (for an analysis of the intersection between Spanish patent 
law and competition law). 
149 Legal Protection of Industrial Design Law (B.O.E. 2003, 20) (Spain). 
150 Patent Law (B.O.E. 2015, 24) (Spain). 
151 B.O.E. 2001, 924 Article 136(1) (Spain). 
152 Arbitration Act (B.O.E. 2003, 60) (Spain) (Author’s translation: “They are not of free choice, 
and therefore excluded from mediation or arbitration, those subject-matters relating to the procedures for 
granting, opposing, or appeals to, rights regulated in this Law, when the object of the controversy is 
compliance with the requirements for its granting, maintenance or validity.” (Emphasis added)). 
153 De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 91, 95 (elaborating on the topic by discussing the whether 
an arbitrator could also declare the expiration of a patent); Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 36–37, 39 
(stressing the arbitral function of the patent and trademarks regulatory agency of Spain, OEPM, pursuant 
to Article 3 Royal Decree No. 1270/1997, of 24 July 1997). 
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the fact that the excerpted exclusion of arbitrability is only applicable 
whenever “the object of the controversy” concerns patent validity, 
understood as the principal claim in a dispute. Such a solution is applicable 
by analogy to other registered industrial IP rights, such as trademarks or 
industrial designs. Unfortunately, the answer is still undefined, since no 
clarification by courts or lawmakers has shed light on these questions yet.154 
As seen next, this falls short of the competitive framework established by 
U.S. federal law. 
c. U.S. Federal Law: Defined inter-partes Arbitrability 
Title 9 of the United States Code, or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 
articulates a basic statutory regime for arbitration in the United States.155 
Chapter 2 establishes the framework for international arbitration by 
implementing the New York Convention, which was ratified by the United 
States in 1970. This created a so-called dualist system since chapter 1 
addresses inter-state and certain foreign commerce, while Chapter 2 is 
applicable to those matters falling within the scope of the Convention. As to 
enforcement of international awards in the United States, there is a 
“presumptive recognition of awards,” which is subject to the exceptions of 
the New York Convention.156 
Although the FAA does not lay down an express preemptive provision 
as regards its interaction with state laws, it has been affirmed but the United 
States Supreme Court that the FAA preempts state law addressing the same 
subjects.157 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court considered a 
class-wide arbitration clause contained in cellular telephone contracts.158 The 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held 
that § 2 of the FAA did not preempt a state law precedent of the California 
                                                                                                                           
 
154 T.S.J. Madrid, Jan. 30, 2013 (No. 95 of 30) (Spain) (STSJ MAD 2005/2013 denied res judicata 
effect to an extrajudicial award to support the registration of a notorious trademark at the register. 
Although it was disputed whether it constituted arbitration or expert determination). 
155 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 152. 
156 BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 159; Maria Chedid & Amy Endicott, Chapter 31—International 
Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 708 (Laurence Shore et al. eds., 2017). 
157 BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 161–62 (citing, among others, American Ins. Ass’n (et al.) v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)). 
158 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011). 
2019] ECONOMICS OF ARBITRABILITY 223 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.164 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Supreme Court on unconscionable clauses.159 Thus § 2 of the FAA, which 
reads “[a]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract,” prevails.160 
Notwithstanding the federal statutory background, the notion of 
arbitrability is rather complex under U.S. law. This is mostly attributable to 
two cumulative facts. First, the case law of the Supreme Court has been 
largely confusing when deciding on (non-)arbitrability and the scope of 
arbitration.161 The best example is the decision First Options of Chicago v. 
Kaplan, in which the Supreme Court referred to an arbitrability question as 
an issue of arbitral jurisdiction.162 Second, the provisions of the FAA do not 
expressly define the notion of arbitrability, which has to be identified by 
application of other statutes.163 As to intellectual property, 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) 
addresses arbitrability of validity claims in patent disputes accordingly 
applied by the federal courts, as in Rhone-Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. 
SCM Corp.:164 
Voluntary arbitration 
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a 
provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or 
infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the 
parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing 
to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in 
equity for revocation of a contract (emphasis added).165 
As to trademarks, there is no clear statutory provision, but it is generally 
interpreted by case law. The landmark decision is Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                           
 
159 Id. at 357. 
160 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
161 For an elaborate discussion of the topic see George A. Bermann, The ‘Gateway’ Problem in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4, 29 (2012); PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 
72–73. 
162 First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 938–41. 
163 BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 964–65. 
164 Id. at 991–92; 35 U.S.C. § 294(a); Rhone-Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (but note that 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) was enacted after this case was decided). 
165 35 U.S.C. § 294(a). 
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Hallmark Cards, Inc.,166 in which the court followed the pro-arbitration 
approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.167 For the purpose of this research, however, another 
important feature of U.S. law for international IP arbitration, as opposed to 
Spain, is found at 35 U.S.C. § 294 (c), (d), and (e). The first paragraph sets 
forth the inter-partes effect of awards while articulating a consistent interplay 
with the Federal Circuit: 
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the 
arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person. The parties to an 
arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which is the subject matter of an 
award is subsequently determined to be invalid or unenforceable in a judgment 
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal can or has 
been taken, such award may be modified by any court of competent jurisdiction 
upon application by any party to the arbitration. Any such modification shall 
govern the rights and obligations between such parties from the date of such 
modification (emphasis added).168 
Sections 294(d) and (e) subject the enforcement of awards to a 
notification regime of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.169 As argued 
below,170 IP litigation has a socially valuable information function that is 
herewith ensured. The duty of notification sponsors such positive externality 
by providing third parties with knowledge about IP litigation in a controlled 
way. Overall, the defined U.S. notion of inter-partes arbitrability, together 
with its accurate interplay with state courts and the Office, sets up an 
advantageous framework for conducting international IP arbitration. 
Notably, it ensures predictable outcomes to foreign market players. Section 
294 states: 
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or licensee 
shall give notice thereof in writing to the Director. There shall be a separate notice 
prepared for each patent involved in such proceeding. Such notice shall set forth 
                                                                                                                           
 
166 Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1998). 
167 AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 n.21 (1985); see also BORN (2014), supra note 
76, at 992 (and further case law cited therein); Adamo, supra note 13, at 9, 14–15; Mantakou, supra note 
22, at 266–67; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 24. 
168 35 U.S.C. § 294(c) (emphasis added). 
169 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) and (e). 
170 See infra Sections III.D.2.b and 3. 
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the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, and the name of 
the patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent, and shall contain a 
copy of the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such 
modification shall give notice of such modification to the Director. The Director 
shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the same in the record of the prosecution 
of such patent. If the required notice is not filed with the Director, any party to the 
proceeding may provide such notice to the Director. 
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection (d) is 
received by the Director.171 
III. A STUDY IN TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL IP ARBITRABILITY 
A. The Contract Principle for Coordination 
“Consent guarantees mutual gains, which is the basis for the efficiency 
of competitive markets.”172 This statement from Thomas Miceli 
accommodates, on the one hand, the notion that agreements are in principle 
mutually beneficial and a vehicle for Pareto Efficient Changes. This is 
because an agreement allows parties to secure an advantage—i.e. again—of 
some kind, resulting in a Pareto superior reallocation of resources. In short, 
this is making one party better off without making another party worse off.173 
Following Miceli’s model-based analysis,174 U1(A) and U2(A) represent 
the utility functions of two individuals given an arbitrary initial allocation of 
resources (A). Any point within the area ABC represents a new, consented 
Pareto superior allocation. With the move of the utility functions, both 
parties are as well off as in the previous one (A) and at least one of them is 
strictly better off without the other being worse off. However, the agreed 
reallocation will only be Pareto efficient (i.e., optimal) if a point is on the 
curve BC. This means, if it ends up located on the Utility Possibility Frontier, 
                                                                                                                           
 
171 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) & (e). 
172 THOMAS J. MICELI, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 6 (2009). 
173 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 2–5; EJAN MACKAAY, LAW AND ECONOMICS FOR CIVIL 
LAW SYSTEMS 479 (2013); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 283 (focusing on enforceability); Shavell, 
supra note 38, at 42–46. See also MICELI, supra note 172, at 6 (who compares the actual consent required 
for Pareto superior reallocations with an implied consent for a Kaldor-Hicks criterion and further 
elaborates on the limitations of the Pareto criterion). 
174 MICELI, supra note 172, at 4–6. 
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that would be the situation whenever no further reallocation is Pareto 
superior to it without making one party worse off. Arguably, this is achieved 
in contracting by incorporating terms that add net value to the bargain. Such 













MICELI, supra note 
172, at 5. 
 
 
On the other hand, Miceli’s statement triggers the idea that consent 
allows individuals to coordinate in order to continuously innovate and 
specialize, which results in competitive advantages. Whenever parties resort 
to a formal institutional framework to ensure such coordination, we talk 
about contracting, since contracts are, in principle, legally enforceable 
promises.176 IP contracting enables market players to use, exploit and 
exchange specialized or innovative outcomes for other specialized or 
innovative outcomes. This also sponsors the improvement of such 
specialized or differentiated resources on a continuous base.177 First, 
specialization promotes productivity as everyone can devote a bigger part of 
their resources to more efficiently do one single activity. From an 
organizational view, for instance, a firm can more efficiently produce certain 
                                                                                                                           
 
175 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 6–7 (in law and economics literature it is known as 
“enlarging the contractual pie.” They identify six examples of gains to be secured through agreements: 
(1) differences in valuation, (2) advantages in production, (3) complementarities, (4) borrowing and 
lending, (5) allocation of risk, and (6) different expectations; see infra Section III.B.3. 
176 See infra Part I; Merges, supra note 5, at 1515 (transactions are not necessarily contracts). 
177 Lemley, supra note 11, at 750 (Arguing: “[a] patent system that encourages innovation needs to 
encourage the diffusion of knowledge. Inventors are not working in isolation.”). 
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IP-protected technologies. Second, innovation allows us to do an activity in 
a singular fashion, for which a company can charge higher prices. A clear 
example is innovative product positioning.178 
Besides contracting, one can argue that there are alternative sources to 
achieve consent between strangers at a relatively cheap cost. In new 
institutional economics, they are commonly known as informal 
institutions.179 These may be, for instance, the threat of social sanctions in 
parties’ familiar environment, or reputational punishments within a particular 
industry. Also, the adoption of a tit-for-tat strategy in relational contracts.180 
However, in stark contrast with contract law, none of these alternatives is 
always desirable from a market efficiency perspective, since both somehow 
reduce (international) market competition. 
i. Market competition is materially curtailed because reliance on 
social sanctions, as an ultimate source of trust for coordination 
consent, limits the scope of activity. Social sanctions are not 
effective, probably not even existent, if a market player wants to 
operate beyond its social sphere, beyond the scope in which it 
develops its normal business. For example, the reputational 
punishment is only significant for a market player within a specific 
industry and limited to a concrete environment. 
ii. Relational contracts subjectively reduce cross-border market 
competition. Any increase of trust is, by definition, based on 
prospective interactions with the same party or within a limited 
group of participants. Competition on concluding long-term 
contracts will then replace competition on prices.181 
The point to be made is that protection of specialization and innovation 
provided by IP rights does not per se suffice. Clearly, reliance on 
enforcement of IP rights worldwide reduces the risks of investing in 
                                                                                                                           
 
178 WILLIAN VAN CAENEGEM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INNOVATION vii, 3 (2007) 
(“[a]pplied technologies also require further compatible technologies to function efficiently”); PORTER 
(2009), supra note 2, at 263, 372, 375; Barnett, supra note 9, at 789. 
179 Williamson, supra note 7, at 598 (referring to: “[i]nformal constraints [like] sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct”); Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 227–29. 
180 See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 299–305 (further explanation on the concept of 
Relational Contracts). 
181 ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHÄFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END THE 
POVERTY OF NATIONS 88, 90 (2012). 
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innovation. Having an undisputed market-organizing function by granting 
temporal monopolies, IP rights are the first step for rewarding efforts in 
R&D, fostering technologic development and innovation. Beyond this 
incentive theory, IP rights play two crucial transactional roles by affecting 
precontractual liability and enforcement flexibility.182 However, new 
institutional economics literature stresses that this is only part of the story.183 
As demonstrated in this work, reliable international enforcement—frequently 
by arbitral tribunals—is a pivotal aspect of channeling IP contracting in order 
to coordinate specialized innovators. This not only results in a higher 
compensation of R&D efforts but ultimately accommodates sustainable 
competitive advantages at the micro- and macroeconomic levels.184 
On the flip side, this dynamic creates massive interdependencies among 
individuals. From a firm boundaries approach, coordination of specialization 
and innovation by means of IP contracting poses a complex trade-off. One 
must opt for less-innovative or less-specialized integrated firms with cheaper 
coordination costs, or highly innovative or highly specialized disintegrated 
firms incurring major costs of coordination.185 For example, those companies 
or industries operating in countries with weak IP rights and poor contract 
enforcement reduce technology transfer in general and they only specialize 
or innovate through vertical integration or other company-like 
arrangements.186 
                                                                                                                           
 
182 Merges, supra note 5, at 1487–89; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 28, at 7. 
183 See infra Part I; Heald, supra note 4, at 474; Williamson, supra note 7, at 597; Vertinsky, supra 
note 10, at 220–22. 
184 Carroll, supra note 22, at 1380–81 (pointing out that an intellectual property system leaves 
compensation to the right-investor to market—i.e., on a transaction structure that “requires courts to 
enforce rights and licenses”—as opposite to direct compensation system or compensation by taxes); VAN 
CAENEGEM, supra note 178, at 4; PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 226, 261. 
185 BENITO ARRUÑADA, TEORÍA CONTRACTUAL DE LA EMPRESA 25–26, 45, 90–106, 153–56 
(1998) (stating that “[l]a especialización no tiene sentido sin intercambio” [Author’s translation: 
“specialization makes no sense without exchange”]; describing companies as a mechanism to minimize 
such coordination costs); Barnett, supra note 9, at 838 (stating: “[i]f firms could rely on patents to contract 
safely over intellectual assets with third parties in order to minimize commercialization costs, then transfer 
of risk could be mitigated and integrated structures would not be necessary in order to capture innovation 
returns.”). See also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84–85 (1975); 
see infra Section III.C; PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 369 (as to the trade-off in terms of competitive 
advantages). 
186 Rephrased from Barnett, supra note 9, at 836–37. URS SCHWEIZER, SPIELTHEORIE UND 
SCHULDRECHT 153 (2015); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 283; Buccafusco et al., supra note 17, at 6; 
cf. Williamson, supra note 7, at 602–03 (correlating transaction hazards and their cost economizing 
safeguards on a NIE basis. From simple to complex forms of governance, his scheme shows conditions 
for replacing credible commitments with vertical integration, and vice versa.). 
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Assume three players, P1, P2, P3, operating in three markets, M1, M2, M3, 
whose characteristics for the good, D, are close to perfect competition and 
separated by national borders. Each Player has the capacity to produce three 
types of products A, B and C, all of them integrant parts of a final product D. 
If each Player opts for producing all three goods, they will have to split their 
resources to carry out such production internally. They will, however, avoid 
any interdependence and therefore reduce coordination costs. Conversely, if 
P1 produces A; P2, B; and P3, C, they will competitively specialize and 
innovate as they will be able to dedicate most of their resources to perfect 
one single activity. However, they will need to cross-border coordinate each 
other to obtain the two missing components of the final product D. This 
principally occurs at the intercompany level, creating firm-to-firm 
dependencies. However, it can also take place at the intra-company level, i.e. 
among the units of firm with a global strategy. 
i. Coordination costs are significant because consent is hard to 
achieve. Lack of trust between interdependent but unknown 
individuals generally looms over any exchange whose performance 
is not simultaneous. It inevitably hampers the conclusion of an 
otherwise mutually beneficial agreement. Deferred exchanges 
create risks of exploitation and, therefore, uncertainties in 
cooperation and they increase transaction costs. These hazards hold 
particularly true on the occasion of international coordination. 
Among many other factors, cross-border IP transactions are 
affected by: cultural differences, heterogeneity of legal 
backgrounds, reluctance to solve future disputes before certain 
courts, and geographical distance. All this contributes to reduce 
trust and, ultimately, to hinder consent.187 This is neatly 
exemplified by the following agency game: 
While the arrows indicate courses of action (cooperate or 
appropriate), the numbers represent the pay-offs for each player (A, 
B). The game assumes an overall Pareto Superior change of 1, 
which is equally distributed (0, 5). If Party A decided to trust Party 
B and to cooperate by initially performing (invest 1), the latter has 
                                                                                                                           
 
187 See PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 369 (including also problems of incentives for an 
intracompany, global coordination). 
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the option to cooperate (0, 5) or to exploit (1). In this modeled 
scenario, an economically rational Party B will exploit A if the pay 
off of exploiting (1) is higher than that of cooperating (0, 5).188 If 
Party A anticipates such exposure to exploitation, it will never trust 
Party B. As a result, it will not coordinate to enter into a mutually 
beneficial agreement. 
 
ii. Furthermore, coordination costs are high because consent is 
expensive. Any attempts to create trust between interdependent 
strangers leads them to incur transactions costs. These costs are 
usually higher at an international level given many of the 
aforementioned factors.189 Initially, searching costs are incurred 
trying to identify a reliable potential counterparty. Later, 
information costs arise in setting up reliability by eliminating 
information asymmetries. Bargaining overcomes such 
asymmetries by means of credible disclosure of significant 
information. For instance, by providing lengthy representations 
and warranties or with overwhelming tables of due diligence.190 
                                                                                                                           
 
188 HACKER, supra note 19, at 29 (for the concept of homo economicus). 
189 ARRUÑADA, supra note 185, at 145. 
190 IP law is, in some occasions, also aimed at reducing transaction costs as discussed by Antoni 
Rubí Puig, Copyright Exhaustion Rationales and Used Software: A Law and Economics Approach to 
Oracle v. UsedSoft, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 159, 161 (2013) (concerning 
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Other trust-enhancing measures could be signing a creditworthy 
parent company as collateral or opening a letter of credit only 
payable against a clean bill of lading.191 
Contract law, understood as institution,192 solves the coordination problem 
by redistributing parties’ pay-offs. Whenever a deferred exchange takes 
place, contract law paves the path for consent by enabling credible promises 
at a low cost. This stems from one of the key roles of contract law: enforcing 
contracts by raising the costs of non-performance in an ex post scenario. As 
a result, it removes the risks of exploitation and uncertainty in cooperation 
ex ante. “The first purpose of contract law is to enable people to cooperate 
by converting games with non-cooperative solutions into games with 
cooperative solutions” (emphasis added).193 
Back to the agency model: As seen in absence of the coordination effect 
of contract law, the game had non-cooperative solutions. If, instead, one can 
rely on contract enforcement, the economically rational strategy for Party B 
is now to cooperate. In this second scenario, the pay-off of exploiting (-0, 5) 
is lower than of cooperating (0, 5). This is so because contract law redresses 
the pay-offs. In case of breach, Party B is obliged to return the appropriated 
investment (1) and pay expectation damages (0, 5). If Party A anticipates 
such enforcement on the breaching party B, it will trust B. As a consequence, 
it will consent to enter into a mutually beneficial exchange and cooperate in 




                                                                                                                           
 
exhaustion of copyright). Cf. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 312–13 
(2004) (as regards the trust-enhancing effect of specific investments). 
191 For a view on legal drafting see David Echenberg, Negotiating International Contracts: Does 
the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of National Legal Requirements, 
in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND APPLICABLE LAW 15–16 
(Guiditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2011); Fabio Bortolotti, Ch. 6—Drafting, Negotiating and Concluding 
International Contracts, in DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 103–04 (2013). For the economics: MACKAAY, supra note 173, at 492; KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 26; ARRUÑADA, supra note 185, at 143. 
192 Fernando Gómez Pomar, El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Español, 3 INDRET 1, 4–
6 (2007); for the concept of institutions, particularly as regards a study in new institutional economics see 
Williamson, supra note 7, at 596–97; Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 227–29. 
193 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 285 (emphasis added); see SCHWEIZER, supra note 186, at 
156–70 (for the constellation, in economics terms, of breaches of contract and corresponding remedies). 
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Adapted from COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 1, at 285. 
 
In short, according to the Contract Principle for Coordination,194 
contract law basically enables people to credibly commit to doing what they 
say without the need to incur excessive transaction costs to prove themselves 
trustworthy in front of a counter party. In exactly the same way, “transaction 
cost economics subscribe to the idea that the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis, and governance is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate 
conflict and realize mutual gains” (emphasis added).195 
Whenever contracts are perceived to be properly enforced, parties 
anticipate that contract law will punish non-cooperative moves. Relevant ex 
ante effects of the Contract Principle for Coordination are crucially reliant 
on an ex post scenario. Namely, creating trust for consent crucially depends 
on certainty in enforcing a promise. Contact law enforces promises by 
implementing a redistribution of pay-offs, for instance, by imposing 
expectation damages to a breaching party.196 Nevertheless, mere perception 
of timely enforcement is often sufficient, perhaps even more desirable, than 
its real implementation.197 Back to the model above, if the new rewards for 
                                                                                                                           
 
194 COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 83. 
195 Williamson, supra note 7, at 599. In the author’s classification, “governance” includes contracts 
and contract law as formal institutions. 
196 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 283 (stating: “[e]conomic efficiency usually requires 
enforcing a promise if the promisor and promisee both wanted enforceability when it was made.”); 
SCHWEIZER, supra note 186, at 153–54. 
197 Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 231: “[t]he capacity for feasible foresight allows parties to limit 
some of the negative effects of this opportunism by constructing mechanisms that allow for credible 
commitments to behave cooperatively” referring to Williamson, supra note 7, at 10. This is so because 
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each party 0, 5, -0, 5 were perceived as enforced, performance turned to be 
ceteris paribus the best strategy. Since economically rational individuals can 
anticipate that, they opt for due performance in the first place. 
To sum up, parties can fall back on contract law to cheaply consent to 
mutually beneficial agreements for innovation and specialization. Together 
with IP rights, enforcement of IP contracts results in Pareto Superior 
exchanges and in fostering competitive advantages. Ultimately, it all leads to 
the efficiency of competitive markets. “The first purpose of contract law is 
to enable people to convert games with inefficient solutions into games with 
efficient solutions” (emphasis added).198 
B. Economics of Non-Enforcement of International IP Awards 
1. Application of the Model to International IP Arbitration 
Countries’ policies on IP arbitrability, however, particularly as regards 
invalidity questions of registered industrial IP rights, impair contract 
enforcement as perceived by parties. From an economic view, they hamper 
individuals’ chances to make, at a reasonable cost, credible commitments in 
the context of international IP contracting. For many reasons,199 parties to an 
international IP agreement may consider state court litigation as unable to 
guarantee contract enforcement in the same way that a private arbitral 
tribunal does. As discussed, the venue of such contract non-enforcement is 
the procedure for recognition and enforcement of international awards under 
the auspices of the New York Convention. In it, non-arbitrability policies are 
considered ex officio by, or raised as defense before, state courts of the 
country where enforcement of an IP contract may be ultimately needed. 
Assume, for instance, a valid license contract between a Swiss IP-holder 
and a German trader with a Spanish branch, for a patent registered in 
                                                                                                                           
 
the goal is always to conclude a “self-enforcing contract” to save implementation costs of enforcement. 
Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 314–15 (2016) 
(exemplifying this concept with the vending machines case); ARRUÑADA, supra note 185, at 173. 
198 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 286 (emphasis added); SCHWEIZER, supra note 186, at 154. 
199 See infra Section III.B.3 (discussing the reasons to opt for international arbitration in IP 
disputes). 
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Switzerland, Germany and Spain.200 Upon breach of contract by the 
Hamburg-based trader, the parties commenced an ICC arbitration seated in 
Zürich. During litigation, the German company raised a defense of invalidity 
against the underlying patent in dispute. In the award, the arbitral tribunal 
merely declares invalidity unsubstantiated and grants damages for breach of 
contract to the Swiss IP-holder and orders the German trader to cease the 
current sale of products in Hamburg and in Barcelona. As outlined 
elsewhere,201 this award does not contravene—at least regarding IP non-
arbitrability policies—the law of the seat. However, non-arbitrability policies 
of both destination States may deny enforcement of the award, requiring the 
commencement of proceedings before the German and Spanish courts. 
The failure to reliably enforce the new pay-offs adjudicated by the 
Zürich-seated tribunal, without a court proceeding commenced anew, 
somehow unwinds the Contract Principle for Coordination. If the Spanish 
provisions Article 2(1) of the LA Act and Article 136(2) of the Patent Law 
(relevant at the enforcement stage as a result of Article 46(2) of the LA Act 
in light of Article V(2) of the New York Convention) are interpreted as to 
deny exequatur to the international award, the underlying IP agreement is left 
unenforced at the country where such is desperately needed. This obstructs 
the ex ante trust-creating effect of contract law, making the Swiss and 
German parties unable to make cheap credible commitments by falling back 
on contract law. With it, coordination on specialization and innovation 
protected by IP rights results are disrupted, curbing competitive 
advantages.202 
Since not all IP agreements deserve to be enforced, the argument of this 
research should not be misconstrued. Economically, contract enforcement is 
proven to be a pillar for achieving Pareto superior gains, which result from 
                                                                                                                           
 
200 This hypothetical is partly based on CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 123. See infra Section 
III.D (discussing an important, real case). 
201 See infra Section II.C.3 (from a legal comparative viewpoint). 
202 See infra Sections III.A and III.C; SCHUMPETER, supra note 185, at 84–85; PORTER (2009), 
supra note 2, at 369, 372, 375; ARRUÑADA, supra note 185, at 25–26, 88 (discussing how exchange allows 
specialization, resulting in greater productivity and overall efficiency of markets). For IP scenario, see 
Carroll, supra note 22, at 20–21 (stressing that an intellectual property system “[r]equires courts to enforce 
rights and licenses” (emphasis added) to assure compensation to right-holders). In the hypothetical above, 
the Swiss IP-holder was assumedly specialized in developing patentable technologies while the German 
trader was so into innovatively commercialize new technologies. With affordable and reliable 
coordination, both get higher returns on their investments in R&D. 
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the exchange of specialized or innovative resources protected by IP rights. 
These transactions sponsor firms’ competitive advantages, upholding 
efficiency in competitive markets. On the flip side, however, two main 
limitations must be respected as regards contract enforcement, also pointed 
out from an economic standpoint:203 
(a) validity in the formation of the contract; and 
(b) impact of contract performance on third parties. 
Whereas validity of contract provides most of the arguments for the 
traditional approach to non-arbitrability policies on certain IP disputes, the 
latter is a central rationale of an up-to-date debate. All concerns raised by the 
affectation of third parties are at the center of a discussion that insistently 
reviews IP non-arbitrability policies at the subsequent stage of recognition 
and enforcement of international awards.204 
2. Synthesis 
For the sake of further clarification, the argument is neither that non-
arbitrability policies on IP validity suppress enforcement of IP rights or the 
opportunity to conclude mutually beneficial contracts. Namely, IP rights and 
their transactions are nevertheless supported by applicable IP law and 
contract law. However, in this event, state courts will enforce them. In 
particular, IP coordination will still exist to the extent that parties identify 
entering into certain agreements as mutually beneficial, on grounds of 
sustainable competitiveness and Pareto changes in their resources. Namely, 
only in those scenarios in which transactions costs at the moment of the 
contract’s conclusion are higher than its expected returns, will individuals 
refrain from contracting. 
The synthesis of this research is more relaxed. Economically rational 
parties will react non-efficiently, as long as they anticipate that an 
international award incidentally dealing with validity of an IP right will lead 
                                                                                                                           
 
203 Shavell, supra note 38, at 45; but cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 283 (aiming to “replace” 
the bargain theory in answering the question “why contracts should be enforced?”); COOTER & ULEN, 
supra note 1, at 289–90 (referring to effects on third parties). From a law and economics view, the notion 
of Efficient Breach has been suggested as third limitation. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (A suitable positive example: 
paragraph (a) reads: “[a]rbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising under 
the contract. [. . .] Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except 
for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract” (emphasis added)). 
204 See infra Sections II.C.2, III.D, and Conclusion. 
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to problematic enforcement in certain jurisdictions under the New York 
Convention. On the one hand, (3) parties will renounce to any increment of 
net value what an agreement on international arbitration as an ADR 
mechanism for IP disputes could have brought to their cross-border bargain. 
On the other hand, even if opting for arbitration, (4) parties will incur higher 
transaction costs, adopting non-efficient contractual protections aimed at 
overcoming troubles in making affordable, credible commitments. From a 
market-efficiency perspective, all this will result in sub-optimal coordination 
between, or among, interdependent players. 
3. Ten Losses of Net Value: Falling Short of the Utility Possibility 
Frontier 
In principle, an arbitration agreement amounts to a net value increment 
for a given bargain. In other words, it enlarges the contractual pie by 
approximating the resulting Pareto change to the parties’ Utility Possibility 
Frontier given their resources.205 Handbooks on international commercial 
arbitration identify at least nine arguments to support the adoption of this 
ADR mechanism over litigation before state-courts: (1) Neutrality; 
(2) centralized dispute resolution; (3) enforceability of agreements and 
awards; (4) cost and speediness; (5) expertise and commercial competence; 
(6) confidentiality or privacy; (7) finality of the decisions; (8) procedural 
flexibility and party autonomy; (9) arbitration involving states and state 
entities.206 
From an economic analysis viewpoint, each of these arguments 
potentially accommodates a net-value-adding term for, at least, one of the 
parties to a contract. An example could be the case where a party faces the 
risk of incurring massive reputational losses, for instance, if the 
                                                                                                                           
 
205 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 11, 26, 49, 51 (presenting the concept of enlarging the 
contractual pie); see infra Graph 1. For constellation of real cases see Heike Wollgast, WIPO Alternative 
Dispute Resolution—Saving Time and Money in IP Disputes, WIPO MAGAZINE, Nov. 2016, at 32 (as well 
as for “TMT cases” (Technology, Media and Telecommunications)); Ignacio De Castro, Leandro Toscano 
& Andrzej Gadkowski, An Update on International Trends in Technology, Media and Telecoms Dispute 
Resolution, Including Intellectual Property Disputes, LES NOUVELLES—INTERNATIONAL TRENDS, 2018, 
at 116, 116–19. 
206 See BORN (2012), supra note 13, at 9, 10–16 (for a summary table, § 1.02); BLACKABY ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 28–39. 
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particularities of the dispute reach the media. An arbitration agreement 
complemented with a confidentiality obligation,207 both incorporated at the 
purchase contract with one of its suppliers, may add net value to the overall 
bargain. The result would be making one party even more better off without 
the other worse off. In other terms, an arbitration agreement places the results 
from the exchange closer to the Utility Possibility Frontier. 
In the context of cross-border IP transactions and in tune with conferring 
inter-partes effect to international awards as the suggested solution,208 this 
work stresses a tenth argument for adopting international commercial 
arbitration as a net-value-adding term: parties’ interest. In short, why would 
a market player be willing to do the arduous work of invalidating an IP right 
for the advantage of its competitors? Why would an IP-holder be interested 
in risking its exclusionary power for a discrete contractual or tort dispute? 
Whereas this would be the case of state-court litigation, whose rulings can 
affect third parties, commercial arbitration offers the possibility to 
incidentally address IP validity, with a limited effect, in order to adjudicate 
on the contractual or tort lawsuit. This may be in the exclusive interest and 
benefit of the litigants, whose only purpose is resolving the contractual or tort 
claim.209 
It must be stressed that an all-or-nothing approach to IP validity does 
not reflect reality. Usually in IP litigation, invalidity claims only concern part 
of the scope protected by the IP right challenged. In others, arbitrators or 
judges only grant partial IP invalidity. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind 
this binary approach equally applies to partial nullity of IP rights. The 
questions formulated above, for instance, do not vary: Why would a market 
                                                                                                                           
 
207 Smith et al., supra note 42, at 314–15. See infra Section II.C; see also BORN (2014), supra note 
76, at 2781 (distinguishing privacy from confidentiality in arbitration). 
208 See infra Sections III.D. and IV. 
209 See WIPO, Why Arbitration in Intellectual Property?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/why-is-arb.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (for arguments to adopt 
arbitration in IP disputes); Adamo, supra note 13, at 28; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 39 (identifying 
the argument of parties’ interest with (1) the arbitrator’s lack of powers to invalidate a disputed IP right. 
The authors enumerate a set of other arguments: (2) readily worldwide enforceability of arbitral awards; 
(3) unity of cross-border or global proceedings; (4) neutrality; (5) flexibility; (6) room for party autonomy 
to choose the decision-makers; and (7) lack of appeal. Finally, they refer to (8) the speediness; (9) lower 
costs of arbitration and (10) confidentiality). See also Smith et al., supra note 42, at 302. Concerning 
positive externalities of IP litigation that could be curtailed by inter-partes effect of arbitral awards, see 
infra Sections III.D.2.c and 3. 
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player be willing to invalidate one of the claims of a patent, or partly cancel 
a trademark, for the benefit of its competitors? Why should an IP-holder risk 
part of the scope of protection vested by its right against third parties?210 
In addition to better accommodating parties’ private interests when 
resolving a dispute over IP rights exploitation, individuals will find 
international arbitration particularly attractive whenever they face a 
multijurisdictional or global lawsuit. As a rule, the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards worldwide guaranteed by the 
New York Convention allows parties to contract around highly costly and 
time-consuming litigation. Otherwise, the extremely fragmented cross-
border IP litigation, resulting from the limited jurisdiction of state courts,211 
would force parties to virtually commence a court proceeding in every single 
country with which an IP conflict has connections.212 Cost and time savings 
are neither the exclusive drivers for adopting international arbitration in this 
kind of dispute but also, and arguably way more significantly, avoiding 
contradicting rulings. 
Notwithstanding, the perception of non-recognition and non-
enforcement of international awards incidentally adjudicating on IP validity 
makes arbitration less attractive: “arbitration would be robbed of its 
advantages.”213 Without certainty in its advantages, parties will walk away 
from this ADR mechanism. In conclusion, they will irremediably give up its 
ten net-value-adding features and, as a consequence, they will fall short of 
their Utility Possibility Frontier. 
                                                                                                                           
 
210 See infra Section III.D.2 (as to partial revocations of industrial IP rights). 
211 De Werra, supra note 13, at 354–55. 
212 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 13, at 29 (stressing that, in contrast to an arbitration clause, a 
forum-selection clause does not benefit from worldwide recognition and enforcement). 2012 O.J. (L 351) 
20 (EU) (the EU Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters is, perhaps, the most salient exception). 
213 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 51; for the argument in the legal side see, e.g., Haas, 
supra note 53, at 519 (stating: “[i]f one completely removes subject matters from the jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunals, then the business community is deprived of an effective method of resolving conflicts 
in the area of international business transactions.”); De Werra, supra note 13, at 376–77. 
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4. Contractual Protective Measures: From Integrative to Distributive 
Bargaining 
Without walking away from arbitration, the usual solution would be to 
contractually allocate the risk of bad IP-dispute resolution to one of the 
parties. Namely, this risk is the lack of proper, reliable enforcement of 
international awards and the subsequent need to initiate multiple court 
procedures anew. From a law and economics viewpoint, parties will 
overcome this issue by incurring drafting and bargaining costs214 aimed at 
proving themselves trustworthy. For instance, by adding a compliance 
guarantee sanctioned with a fixed sum on damages to be paid in case state 
courts of a relevant jurisdiction deny enforcement to a resulting award. As 
just pointed out, this increases transaction costs in a two-fold scheme of 
consequences. 
In an extreme case, high transaction costs could cause parties to refrain 
from entering into an agreement at all, whenever its conclusion is costlier 
than the expected returns. In a second scenario, the economics of contract 
drafting illustrate that parties will only allocate risks at the moment of 
contract conclusion (ex ante), if the transaction costs of doing so are lower 
than the potential losses of not allocating them.215 The latter figure results 
from the materialized losses ex post, taking into account the allocation 
otherwise conducted by applicable default rules, multiplied by the probability 
that the event occurs. 
allocating a risk > allocating a loss × its probability → leave gap, 
allocating a risk ≤ allocating a loss × its probability → fill gap 
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen resort to this formula to illustrate, on a 
general contractual basis, the minimization of transaction costs in contract 
drafting.216 For the subject matter of this research, allocating a loss stands 
for all materialized losses whenever an international award is not enforced at 
a given jurisdiction on grounds of non-arbitrability of—incidentally 
decided—IP invalidity. 
                                                                                                                           
 
214 Echenberg, supra note 191, at 13–14; Bortolotti, supra note 191, at 100–01 (emphasizing self-
sufficient contracts). 
215 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 49. 
216 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 293. 
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Contract drafting measures, however, cannot fully work in addressing 
the outlined problem. On the one hand, beyond the possibility of a voluntary 
compliance with an arbitral decision, any added trust-enhancing clause will 
anyways remain affected by the non-enforcement uncertainty itself. 
Whenever an award-debtor sits in a jurisdiction whose state courts are to 
apply a broad non-arbitrability policy under Article V(2) of the New York 
Convention, any contractual provisions are also likely to be left unenforced. 
Therefore, the effect of making a commitment more credible is arguably 
limited. 
On the other hand, whenever the benchmark upon which parties are 
drafting an agreement is unpredictable, parties have no available loss-
allocating default rule from which to deviate. In a comparative survey, this is 
the case of non-arbitrability polices on IP validity. In too many instances, 
they are subject to changes in criteria depending on political or economic 
needs or their unclear meanings are lacking consistent interpretations by high 
courts. This also results in contradicting arbitrability policies worldwide, 
posing relevant preliminary information costs to parties.217 
Conclusively, without the option of legal-drafting engineering, the only 
operable solution to nevertheless reach an assumedly mutually beneficial 
exchange is a simple business decision. As stated before, as long as costs of 
bargaining are lower than expected returns, economically rational parties are 
going to secure mutual gains of coordinating specialized or innovative 
resources. In so doing, however, parties will hedge the risk of bad 
international commercial IP arbitration by agreeing upon a lower price. 
“Slow, uncertain legal processes cause a rational person to discount the 
court’s remedy, like a ten-year junk bond.”218 
Whereas a commercial bargain is primarily a Pareto Superior change 
with which both parties are better off, agreeing on a lower price is a claim of 
such contractually generated surplus. The former, in which both or at least 
one party is strictly better off without the other being worse-off, translates 
into lateral moves of their utility functions. Conversely, with a claim of 
generated value, one individual results in being better off and the other is 
                                                                                                                           
 
217 Viscasillas, supra note 71, at 29, 33, 47; Smith et al., supra note 42, at 356. 
218 COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 91. 
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worse off. In negotiation terms, it is no longer a bargain to generate 
integrative value but a claim of distributive value.219 
This price-hedging decision, as a distributive claim, has a paramount 
advantage: to enable mutually beneficial international IP coordination. On 
the flip side, however, it does not come free of expense. It affects firms in, 
and GDPs of, countries having stringent non-arbitrability policies under 
Article V(2)(a)(b) of the New York Convention. Such a business-driven 
answer entails devastating consequences in terms of competitive advantages 
at micro- and macroeconomics levels. These are discussed in the following 
section. 
C. Two-Fold Consequences on Competitive Advantages 
In the economy paradigm of the 21st century,220 a companies’ 
performance is no longer reliant on comparative advantages but on 
competitive advantages. Companies’ competition on obtaining necessary 
production factors offered at the lowest opportunity cost has been replaced 
by competition on productivity. This new scenario is given by the fact that 
firms all around can nowadays more easily equalize comparative advantages 
but need to highly specialize and innovate. Cutting-edge technologies, 
product positioning or innovative commercialization are, among other IP-
protected factors, what create sustainable competitive advantages.221 
1. Microeconomics: Learning from Porter’s Competitiveness 
Sustainable competitive advantages directly result from two venues: 
companies’ strategies or efficient operations. The latter is primarily upheld 
by specialization and/or innovation, usually protected by IP rights.222 Hence, 
                                                                                                                           
 
219 For the function see MICELI, supra note 172, at 5; as elaborated in Section III.A, infra. For the 
integrative vs. distributive negotiation see Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value 
Creation and Value Claiming During Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 101, 
117–18 (2010); KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57, at 53–54; Shavell, supra note 38, at 43. 
220 See infra Section I.A, introductory remarks; Barnett, supra note 9, at 832–38. 
221 PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 225–27, 253 (exemplifying that a cost reduction by 10% as a 
result of adopting economies of scale can easily be surpassed by developments of new products); PORTER 
(2009), supra note 2, at 374–75; PORTER (1980), supra note 2, at 280–81. 
222 PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 366 (explaining how the Value Chain allows the identification 
of companies’ strategies). 
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efficient operations encompass not only cheaper production than 
competitors, resulting from specialization, but also differentiation in the 
market. Differentiation becomes of particular interest whenever it allows 
charging an extra price higher than the cost of differentiating itself.223 
Registered industrial IP rights, such as patents and utility models, 
address technical innovation, which should allow companies to produce at 
lower costs, with more characteristics or with innovative quality. In turn, 
trademarks and registered industrial designs are in charge of 
commercialization and product positioning in a differentiated fashion. 
International IP coordination fosters exchange, use, exploitation and 
permanent improvement. As claimed: “[c]ontinuous improvement of 
competitive advantages is the best way to defend them.”224 In either case, the 
key idea is again that not only has worldwide enforcement of IP rights 
protecting specialization and innovation become crucial, but it requires a 
proper enforcement of IP contracting. 
As mentioned, this synthesis holds equally true for intra- or inter-
company approach, since both entail major interdependencies. On the one 
hand are the cross-border up- and downstreams of efficient operations 
between business units, protected by IP rights inside a unique, truly global 
company. On the other hand, cross-border outsourcings of specialization and 
innovation protected by IP rights in the market.225 The latter transactions 
principally occur at the expense of affordable contractual coordination, 
finally reliant on the proper international enforcement of contracts. As a 
consequence, the business, price-driven decision of hedging bad international 
IP arbitration utterly collapses—at least for one party—most of the gains in 
competitiveness that result from a cross-border IP coordination. 
                                                                                                                           
 
223 PORTER (1980), supra note 2, at 280 (for IP-intense industries); see generally PORTER (2009), 
supra note 2, at 363–65. 
224 PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 226, 229, 231, 263. For all, see SCHUMPETER, supra note 185, 
at 84–85 (defining competition on innovation); VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 178, at 4 (referring to the 
Schumpeter’s “Gale of Creative Destruction.”). From the IP law perspective see Lemley, supra note 11, 
at 711, 715, 750. 
225 See infra Part I, Introduction. The current economy favors innovative (risk-taking) products, 
which require that companies find a fit in the supply chain management and efficiency in outsourcing. 
One of the important drivers to so achieve is the transfer of intellectual property rights from an OEM to 
its retailers (downstream) up to its suppliers (upstream), for all on the supply chain management 
implications. See Stephan M. Wagner, Pan Theo Grosse-Ruyken & Feryal Erhun, The Link Between 
Supply Chain Fit and Financial Performance of the Firm, 30 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 340, 340–42 (2012); 
PORTER (1980), supra note 2, at 296–97; PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 229, 374; Barnett, supra note 
9, at 795–97. 
2019] ECONOMICS OF ARBITRABILITY 243 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.164 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Companies in jurisdictions where courts apply unclear or changing, 
disruptive non-arbitrability policies under Article V(2)(a)—and perhaps 
(b)—of the New York Convention must pay higher, or are forced to receive 
lower, prices for cross-border IP coordination. Uncertainty in the 
enforcement of international awards incidentally deciding on IP validity 
results in firms facing significant troubles for an affordable cross-border IP 
contracting. Hence, they have, from a business view, already lost too much 
on competitive advantages. Given the massive interdependencies existing in 
today’s economic paradigm, these aggrieved firms cannot keep up with the 
challenging race to become sustainably superior in specializing or in 
differentiating. 
This conclusion is supported by Professor Porter’s diamond-model on 
geographical location as a source of productivity—i.e. of competitive 
advantages.226 Taking into account the judiciary system and legislation as 
specialized Factor (Input) Conditions of a country, the diamond-model 
illustrates the forces behind firms’ turnovers. It explains why companies in 
certain jurisdictions achieve greater degrees of specialization and innovation, 









Adapted from PORTER 
(2009), supra note 2, at 
231–32. 
                                                                                                                           
 
226 PORTER (1980), supra note 2, at 286; PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 231–32, 376–77 (for 
nations and companies respectively); PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 360 (for an introduction on the 
relevance of location for global companies). 
227 PORTER (1980), supra note 2, at 286 (highlighting “[p]olicies by home governments that are 
disadvantageous to their firms in international operations.”). See also PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 
225–26, 251, 253, 260, 262 (stressing that circumstances of a country must foster innovation; otherwise, 
a company has no other choice than moving its operations and activities (including headquarters) to 
another country providing a better international framework for specialization and innovation). See also 
SCHUMPETER, supra note 185, at 84–85; Barnett, supra note 9, at 836–37 (from a firms’ organizational 
standpoint). 
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2. Macroeconomics: Learning from Cooter and Schäfer’s Solomon’s 
Knot 
Taking a broader view, in aggregate terms, the overall economies of 
those countries with dysfunctional legal polices face a clear competitive 
disadvantage. Lack of national productivity, understood as lack of national 
sustainable competitive advantage, is what has a most significant negative 
impact on the overall economic performance. For healthier GPDs, better 
labor markets, and higher life-levels for citizens, nations should replace any 
competition on comparative advantages for competition on competitive 
advantages. Countries must replace an institutional framework aimed at 
offering low-cost production factors for institutions that support international 
coordination of IP-protected innovation and specialization.228 
Worldwide unpredictable, vague, or inconsistent arbitrability policies 
barring recognition and enforcement of international awards are clear-cut 
examples of dysfunctional law. In principle, unreliable cross-border award 
enforcement may not per se obstruct companies’ participation in the cross-
border IP in-and-out flows. State courts are going to enforce contract law 
when required. Nevertheless, whenever parties opt for international 
commercial arbitration, such dysfunctional law makes IP coordination 
costlier. Losses of net value, lower incomes or extra costs collapse 
competitive advantages of the firms in those affected jurisdictions.229 
Mirroring the argumentation suggested by Professors Cooter and 
Schäfer,230 this is exemplified by the data collected by the World Bank231 on 
contract enforcement. This must be additionally correlated with the countries 
occupying the top positions in the OECD high-income rank. Namely, 
jurisdictions with efficient contract enforcement, in terms of delays, costs and 
good practices in solving commercial disputes by filing a lawsuit in a first-
                                                                                                                           
 
228 See infra Section III.C. 
229 For different arbitrability policies worldwide see infra Section II.C.4; for an economic study of 
their impact on parties to IP transactions see infra Section III.B.2.3.4. Williamson, supra note 7, at 608 
(neatly stressing the relevance of the institutional environment for nation development). 
230 COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 91–92; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 71, 75. 
For examples of the impact of contract enforcement on the easier with which to get bank financing or on 
the participation in foreign direct investment see Enforcing Contracts, DOING BUSINESS 2013 (World 
Bank Pub.) Oct. 12, 2012 at 90. 
231 Enforcing Contracts, supra note 230, at 90–93; World Bank Group, Doing Business 2015, Going 
Beyond Efficiency 90–95 (2015). 
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instance court, largely correspond with high-incomes nations. Also vice 
versa. 
The following table ranks countries, over June 2011 to June 2012, in 
terms of contract enforcement. To do so, the rank takes into account the 
average resulting from: 
(1) the number of days needed to resolve a commercial dispute; 
(2) attorney, court and overall costs in relation to claims’ value; and 
(3) the use of good practices promoting quality and efficiency of court 
proceedings. 
Where contract enforcement is easiest and most difficult according to Doing 
Business (FR 2013, p. 90) 
Easiest Rank Most difficult Rank 
Luxemburg 1 Syrian Arab Rep. 176 
Korea, Rep. 2 Central African Rep. 177 
Iceland 3 Benin 178 
Norway 4 Honduras 179 
Germany 5 Suriname 180 
United States of 
America 6 Sao Tomé and Príncipe 181 
Austria 7 Bangladesh 182 
France 8 Angola 183 
Finland 9 India 184 
Hong Kong 10 Timor-Leste 185 
As stated by these authors, “besides delays [costs and bad practices] 
another defect is vague laws with unpredictable consequences.”232 This 
seems to be the case, among many others, of arbitrability policies on 
international disputes over certain IP rights, as discussed here. It can be thus 
normatively stated that adopting an arbitration-friendly policy on IP validity 
when enforcing multijurisdictional or global awards constitutes one location-
factor to create key competitive advantages at a micro- and, subsequently, at 
a macroeconomic level. Hence, to somehow contribute to an aggregate 
higher income and, perhaps, as a little help to end the poverty of nations. 
                                                                                                                           
 
232 COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 92. 
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The law, as a legal institutional framework provided by countries, 
should play the indirect role of supporting a desirable competition on 
productivity.233 For instance, by granting inter-partes effect to an 
international award under Article V(2) of the New York Convention, as 
adopted in the United States and examined below. Principally, regarding the 
ever-growing use of commercial arbitration for adjudicating IP exploitation-
disputes in a cross-border arena.234 
D. Is the U.S. System One Step Ahead? 
1. Application of the Synthesis 
As studied elsewhere,235 Section 294 of the U.S. Code grants inter-
partes effect to awards adjudicating on patent validity or infringement arising 
under the contract. The rule further lays down a consistent interplay between 
arbitral awards, the Patent Office and state courts. It comes as no surprise 
that this provision dates back in 1982, when the entire federal judicial system 
to enforce U.S. patent law was enacted. The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) was established to hear, in a centralized and predictable 
fashion, all appeals of patent cases. As result: “The improved enforceability 
of granted patents encouraged applications by making the patent right more 
economically valuable.”236 
Relevant data support this conclusion, which is in tune with the double-
trust dilemma of innovation examined by Professors Cooter and Schäfer.237 
                                                                                                                           
 
233 PORTER (2009), supra note 2, at 251–52 (“indirectly” basically stands for the need to avoid rent-
seeking in lobbing the law-makers to enact, for instance, industry-specific protective legislation). 
234 For empirical data supporting this affirmation, see Section I.A, infra; WIPO, WIPO Caseload 
Summary, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
235 See infra Section II.C.4 (on a comparative analysis highlighting the U.S. arbitration system for 
patents). 
236 JAFFEE & LERNER, supra note 28, at 10 (emphasis added) (The authors also report how the 
redesign of the income system for the U.S. Patent Office in 1990 affected patent applications. Replacing 
the former tax-based financing by a fee-based one incentivized the U.S. Patent Office to grant more patents 
in less time. Hence, the Patent Office dangerously loosened the standards of “non-obvious” and “novelty” 
to be applied in the examination procedure of patent applications.). See also Barnett, supra note 9, at 832. 
237 COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 27–30. The dilemma points out how asymmetric 
information and mistrust disrupts the combination of innovation and capital. In short, investors are 
unwilling to pay for innovative ideas without a previous evaluation. On the flip side, innovators are very 
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Before 1981, the statistics reveal that small companies were performing less 
than 5% of industrial R&D in the United States. In 2002, 21 years later, small 
companies were performing 25%. Such increase by 20% came together with 
an increase of Venture Capitalist (VC) financing: Between 1980 and 2007, 
VCs invested in aggregate $550 billion in start-ups.238 Furthermore, a sound 
survey proved that firms financed by VC had a tendency to increase patenting 
activity. One of the suggested reasons is that innovators sought to secure 
VCs’ finance, who, in return, insisted in protecting innovation and intangible 
assets with U.S. patents.239 
U.S. legislative enactments help demonstrate a key synthesis of this 
research. Namely, the importance, in an ex ante stage of IP contracting, of 
how individuals perceive enforcement ex post. In particular, from a 
transactional perspective, not only enforcement of rights but also of 
contracts. In law and economic terms, not only of property rules but also of 
liability rules.240 Both legislative modifications targeted it: whereas a newly 
established CAFC addressed patents enforcement, a consistent arbitration 
policy guaranteed enforcement of certain IP transactions. On top of that, the 
provisions in the U.S. patent legislation were neatly enacted, signaling legal 
certainty and predictability. 
With all this in mind, the following judgment is chosen to illustrate the 
shift adopted by a developed country (No. 8 in the OECD high income rank) 
regarding non-arbitrability of IP disputes. Namely, the French IP system 
moved its institutional framework somehow closer to the U.S. model but 
                                                                                                                           
 
reluctant to disclose ideas without receiving payment in advance. COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, 
at 32–33 (the authors illustrate how the institutional framework solves such a dilemma. In a three-level 
chart, they explain the role of law of property to obtain relational finance, contracts for private finance, 
and business organizations for public finance). See infra Section II.C.4.c (these rationales also hold true 
for other types of registered industrial IP rights beyond patents, for which, however, it still lacks a specific 
regulation in the United States). 
238 Barnett, supra note 9, at 833 (pointing out, from an organizational viewpoint, how VCs 
externally fulfilled the financing function that otherwise should be satisfied by internal capital in 
integrated firms); COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 181, at 32. 
239 See Stuart H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1255, 1277, 1280–82 (2009) (for the data compilated by the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology 
(BCLT) in its 2008 survey, and how it contradicts previous statistics). 
240 Buccafusco et al., supra note 17, at 30. 
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without sustaining it on any legislative enactment. Before 2008,241 an award 
incidentally dealing with IP validity could not be enforced and, if appropriate, 
was set aside by a French state court. Nonetheless, the Cour d’Appel Paris 
turned the tide in its ruling of 28 Feb. 2008; Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, Civ., Feb. 28, 2008, 05/10577, on the matter between 
Liv Hidravlika D.O.O. vs. Diebolt, S.A.242 
In that case, a Slovenian company, Liv Hidravlika, sought to set aside 
an ICC award rendered on 23 Mar. 2005. The decision was in favor of a 
French company, Diebolt, on grounds that a patent dispute cannot be 
arbitrated per Article 1502-5° of the French Code of Civil Procedure. In 
particular, Liv Hidravlika argued that third parties have an interest in the 
patent assignment and validity, which makes the dispute fall under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of domestic courts.243 The sole arbitrator had assumed 
jurisdiction upon an arbitration clause contained in a distribution contract and 
a patent license contract entered into by the two companies. 
The Paris Court of Appeal confirms the arguments upon which the 
arbitrator had already rejected the objection to its jurisdiction: “même un 
litige concernant la validité d’un brevet ou d’une marque peut être résolu par 
arbitrage, en acceptant la limite de la juridiction de l’arbitre, à savoir qu’une 
telle résolution n’a d’effet qu’entre les parties de l’arbitrage.”244 The decision 
further confirms that arbitrator’s potential finding on validity issues would 
not be res judicata as it would not be part of the operative part of an award. 
                                                                                                                           
 
241 Grantham, supra note 24, at 206; BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 962–63 (for the evolution of 
non-arbitrability in France). 
242 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Civ., Feb. 28, 2008, 05/10577 (Fr.); Smith 
et al., supra note 42, at 333 (explaining the rationale in the following terms: “[s]ince a patent is a public 
title granted by an administrative authority, it concerns ordre public, and questions related to its grant of 
validity cannot be subject to arbitration.”). It must be nevertheless noted that CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE 
[C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] Article 1502-5º (Fr.), enumerating the grounds to reject enforcement, 
refers to ordre public international. 
243 Under French law, without being an exception as compared to other jurisdictions, the distinction 
between public policy and arbitrability appears rather blurred. Haas, supra note 53, at 519 (pointing out 
that countries are replacing the specific policies for controlling arbitrability by a more generic control on 
grounds of public policy). See the discussion in Section II.C.3, infra. 
244 See Phillipe Pinsolle, Thomas Clay & Thomas Voisin, Decision of the Paris Court of Appeal 
1st Chamber (Section C) of 28 Feb. 2008, no. 05/10577—English translation, in FRENCH INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION LAW REPORTS 8 (2008) (for the English translation of the case, upon this abstract is also 
partly based: “[e]ven a dispute on the validity of a patent or a trademark can be settled by arbitration, by 
accepting the limited jurisdiction of the arbitrator, i.e. that the arbitrator’s decision only has effect on the 
parties to the arbitration.”); Fortunet, supra note 117, at 281. 
2019] ECONOMICS OF ARBITRABILITY 249 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.164 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Hence, third parties can always request the patent to be declared void for the 
same reasons. Consequently, the issue of patent validity can be submitted to 
arbitration when discussed incidentally in relation to a contractual dispute. 
On the one hand, this ruling is not an isolated opinion. It is safe to say 
that nowadays there seems to exist an international tendency, both at courts’ 
and academics’ level, to accept the inter-partes effect of international awards 
incidentally dealing with invalidity issues of registered industrial IP rights. 
This solution, known as validity decided in personam, has been embraced by 
other European civil law countries like Germany or Spain.245 All results, 
perhaps, from pressure made by businesspeople and some practitioners (e.g., 
lawyers or arbitrators), who are responsive to the economic impact of non-
arbitrability polices. Consequently, they seek operable solutions on a daily 
basis. Mostly, whenever they need not only enforcement of IP rights but a 
reliable IP coordination at the cross-border level to secure a larger 
contractually generated welfare and competitive advantages. 
On the other hand, one must be aware that the inter-partes effect of 
foreign IP awards is nothing more than a second-best solution, affected by 
important shortcomings as discussed in the next sections. Notwithstanding 
that, a consistent legal framework, like that in the United States, definitely 
provides a much better starting point to tackle them. This is so because it 
offers market players, who are usually foreigners, an invaluable 
predictability. Unfortunately, such clear institutional environment is still 
missing in many jurisdictions and, for this reason, the United States seems to 
be one step ahead. 
2. Legal Limitations 
a. A Constellation of Scenarios 
What happens if a tribunal decides on a contractual or tort claims 
preliminary finding for the validity of an IP right, whose award is enforced 
                                                                                                                           
 
245 See, e.g., Schäfer, supra note 94, at 915; CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 120; De Werra, 
supra note 13, at 359; COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 70; Certilman & Lutzker, supra note 23, at 83; 
Nuria Bouza Vidal, La Arbitrabilidad de los Litigios en la Encrucijada de la Competencia Judicial 
Internacional y de la Competencia Arbitral, 52 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 371, 
374–75 (2000); Viscasillas, supra note 59, at 28; Smith et al., supra note 42, at 356–57; De Miguel 
Asensio, supra note 13, at 91, 95, 101. See infra Section II.C.4 (for a comparative study). 
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with inter-partes effect, but the right is later revoked by state-courts? Or vice 
versa? What if an IP right simply continues to appear on the public register, 
thus becoming enforceable against third parties, but contractual or tort claims 
are left unenforced on grounds of IP invalidity with inter-partes effect? And 
if a party commences state court proceedings parallel to an IP arbitration? 
In practice, either the application of lis pendens principles246 or given 
the substantive expertise of arbitrators and state judges, it seems not too naïve 
to assume that part of the rulings should tend to be consistent as to the validity 
of registered industrial IP rights. However, this is neither a general rule nor 
does it solve numerous questions regarding the interplay between 
international IP awards, national courts and registers. 
As stated elsewhere,247 a final analytical remark is important concerning 
a seemingly binary view taken in the next sections. In a large part of IP cases, 
the invalidity claim only partly affects the IP right challenged. For instance, 
perhaps only some claims of a patent are deemed invalid while the rest are 
upheld. Being aware of this reality and for the sake of clarity, the discussion 
is synthetized by taking an all-or-nothing approach to IP validity. This is 
justified because most of the underlying rationales of a binary approach are 
equally applicable to partial revocations. 
b. Arbitral Tribunal Found for Validity of the Underlying IP 
Right 
The first scenario groups those cases in which an award had adjudicated 
on an IP contractual dispute by a preliminary finding for the validity of the 
underlying right, which is later revoked by a state court decision and deleted 
from the administrative register. 35 U.S.C. § 294 is advantageous because, 
despite its drawbacks, it provides a predictable answer procedurally 
consistent with the federal judicial system. In this regard, paragraph (c) reads: 
[. . .] The parties to an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which is the 
subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to be invalid or 
unenforceable in a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction from 
which no appeal can or has been taken, such award may be modified by any court 
                                                                                                                           
 
246 As regards lis pendens in international arbitration, see BORN (2014), supra note 76, at 3803–04 
(discussing the decision Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v. Genesis Power Ltd., [2006] 3 NZLR 794 (HC) (N.Z.)). 
247 In the economics of IP arbitration as a net-value-adding term, see infra Section III.B.3. 
2019] ECONOMICS OF ARBITRABILITY 251 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.164 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
of competent jurisdiction upon application by any party to the arbitration. Any 
such modification shall govern the rights and obligations between such parties 
from the date of such modification.248 
The rule lays a straightforward solution for enforcing IP arbitration in the 
United States. Whereas it may firstly come at odds that a final IP award can 
be later modified by U.S. state courts, the provision is strictly based upon 
party autonomy. International players are hereby provided with an 
institutional framework that enables them to anticipate a solution, which 
otherwise they would have had to reach under the shadow of the award.249 
Notwithstanding, reasonable concerns loom over the enforcement of court-
amended awards outside the United States. For jurisdictions with less clear 
legislative backgrounds, it remains uncertain whether and to what extent they 
are to recognize and enforce awards—amended or not—upon non-existent 
IP rights. In order to analytically cover these countries, contract and 
infringement lawsuits are treated separately. 
For contract issues, following the decision Genentech Inc. v. Hoechst 
GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH, an obligation of payment of 
royalties upon a non-existent IP right is considered as an exclusive 
contractual duty. In the case, the parties had foreseen that payments of license 
royalties were due even in case of IP right revocation. Hence, because of their 
separate grounds, the obligation was enforced by an arbitral tribunal despite 
the question of IP validity; payment of royalties is based on contract validity 
in IP law. As a consequence, whenever parties already have contractually 
allocated the risk of IP invalidity, subsequent or parallel state court 
judgments on IP revocation are unlikely to affect awards dealing with such 
contractual matters. Royalties, breach, interpretation, etc., are to be 
exclusively decided by an arbitral tribunal if it was so agreed by the parties.250 
                                                                                                                           
 
248 35 U.S.C. § 294(c). 
249 JUAN-JOSE GANUZA & FERNANDO GÓMEZ POMAR, THE STRATEGIC STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT 
LAW 136, 161 (2013) (Explaining the concept of bargaining under the shadow in the context of contract 
remedies for breach. For instance, whenever a party insists on specific performance in scenarios where 
this remedy is dramatically expensive for the other party, what that party seeks is to renegotiate a larger 
damages award still cheaper than specifically performing. The party expects to obtain them as a result of 
the leverage that a “threat of the costs that will be imposed if the negotiations for the larger amount of 
damages break down and specific performance will hit the party in default.” A readily enforceable award 
can also be used as a threat to renegotiate the outcomes of an IP dispute avoiding state court proceedings.). 
250 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 94 (“[t]he obligation to pay royalties flowed not from the 
use of a technology protected by valid patents but from the license agreement alone.”). Cour d’appel [CA] 
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In the dispositive part of the decision, the CJEU interprets that Article 101(1) 
of the TFEU: 
[n]ot precluding the imposition on the licensee [. . .] of a requirement to pay a 
royalty for the use of a patented technology for the entire period in which that 
agreement was in effect, in the event of the revocation or non-infringement of a 
licensed patent, provided that the licensee was able freely to terminate that 
agreement by giving reasonable notice.251 
Another example is the arbitral tribunals’ power to enforce contractual 
obligations that extend beyond the term of protection of a licensed IP right. 
By the same token, above, if a licensee had undertaken a contractual duty to 
pay royalties after an IP right expires, it is because it was in its interest to 
lower the royalty rate over a longer period of time. Party autonomy 
determines whether to extract “a higher rate over a shorter period of time or 
[. . .] a lower rate over a longer period of time.”252 It is to be upheld by courts 
and tribunals regardless of whether the IP right keeps it enforceable. 
Nonetheless, on grounds of antitrust law, this was forbidden by the highly 
criticized decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 
29 (1964).253 In it, the Court missed that competitors are free to use the 
patented process upon patent expiration, irrespective of how royalties are 
paid in a particular license agreement.254 
Less clear-cut solutions are found for infringement cases in which IP 
validity was ancillarily adjudicated. In these scenarios, parties have neither 
anticipated nor, by definition, allocated risks: the law must do so. 
Nonetheless, it appears counterintuitive that a market player can tortiously 
harm something that does not lawfully exist. If the invalidity of an asserted 
                                                                                                                           
 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., July 7, 2016, c-567/14 (Fr.) (Genentech Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH and 
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH) (In this case, the French court raised anti-competition issues. In this 
regard, the CJEU affirmed that, if certain requirements are fulfilled (agreement was to avert patent 
litigation; the licensee can terminate the license agreement by giving notice; and the licensee retains 
freedom of action after terminating the license) EU competition was not affected.); see infra Section 
II.C.3. 
251 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., July 7, 2016, c-567/14 (Fr.) (Genentech 
Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH). 
252 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 380 (2003). 
253 Id. at 418 (Referring to Brulotte v. Thys Co. judgment as “one of the all-time economically dumb 
Supreme Court decisions.”). 
254 Id. at 380–81. 
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industrial IP right is declared after an award on infringement was rendered, 
the suggested solution resides with the expertise of the arbitrators appointed. 
An arbitral tribunal should take the shortcomings here explained into account 
and render a far-sighted decision. For instance, as suggested by some authors: 
“[arbitrators could include] a relief for an undertaking of repayment of the 
award-creditor to the award-debtor in case a disputed IP turns to be declared 
invalid after the enforcement of the award.”255 
c. Arbitral Tribunal Found for Invalidity of the Underlying IP 
Right 
In contrast, a second group of rare post-award cases encompasses state 
court judgments that uphold the validity of an IP right, which was deemed 
invalid by the arbitral tribunal when deciding on contractual or tort claims. 
Much more often, the case concerns an award that preliminarily based the 
non-enforcement of contractual or infringement claims on the invalidity of 
an IP right, while this IP right is simply kept in the register and enforceable 
upon third parties. This occurs whenever the right is not challenged in the 
state court or administrative proceedings.256 The question, addressed jointly 
in contracts and torts, is in what position third parties are left such as other 
licensees of the IP owner or other potential infringers? 
IP litigation informs market players about the status of a certain IP right 
and, therefore, has positive externalities on third parties. IP arbitration, whose 
international awards are merely enforced inter-partes, disrupts such 
informative function of IP litigation. On top of that, the discussion is 
aggravated by two of the characteristics of arbitral proceedings: privacy and, 
sometimes, confidentiality.257 The fundamental question is, conclusively, 
whether the inter-partes effect must accommodate a social welfare 
                                                                                                                           
 
255 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 94, 130 (further elaborating on the restitution claims under 
German law). See infra Section III.D.2.c (for scenarios at the pre-enforcement stage). 
256 See infra Section II.B; Mantakou, supra note 22, at 269–70 (“[v]ery often, issues involving, for 
example, validity or ownership may arise in the form of preliminary issues in the context of a dispute 
involving a license agreement.”). 
257 De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 94. From an economic viewpoint, Posner, supra note 20, 
at 126 (discussing that the lack of published awards reduces predictability of legal outcomes for future 
parties). For the discussion of the concepts in regard to international arbitration, see Sections II.C.3 and 
III.B.3, infra. 
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perspective or welfare has to be reduced to the notion of contractual parties’ 
surplus. As explained above, it may be in the very interest of the parties to 
have a limited inter-partes effect when solving an IP dispute. Neither party 
seeks to invalidate a right for the free benefit of its competitors, nor is the 
other willing to risk losing an exclusionary right against the whole market.258 
Here again, the U.S. Patent system provides an advantageous starting 
point. Sec. 294(d)(e) of the U.S. Code subjects the inter-partes enforcement 
of an award to a notification mechanism. On grounds of predictability, this 
solution somehow intends to accommodate the very private interests of the 
litigants with positive externalities that the informative function of IP 
litigation has. In other words, it sponsors a view of welfare reduced to parties’ 
contractual surplus that does not obstruct a social welfare perspective. While 
third parties are informed of potential issues concerning an identified IP right, 
which still appears at the register, neither of the IP-holders risk their rights in 
a dispute before third parties, nor do traders do the work for their competitors. 
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or licensee 
shall give notice thereof in writing to the Director. There shall be a separate notice 
prepared for each patent involved in such proceeding. Such notice shall set forth 
the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, and the name of 
the patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent, and shall contain a 
copy of the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such 
modification shall give notice of such modification to the Director. The Director 
shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the same in the record of the prosecution 
of such patent. If the required notice is not filed with the Director, any party to the 
proceeding may provide such notice to the Director. 
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection (d) is 
received by the Director.259 
For other jurisdictions lacking a clear legislative source, a line of 
argument suggests that an agreement to arbitrate IP disputes encompasses 
particular remedies per se, such as specific performance relief as regards 
registration of rights.260 Conceptually, the right-holder is free to limit, revoke 
                                                                                                                           
 
258 See infra Section III.B.3. 
259 35 U.S.C. § 249(d) & (e). 
260 For specific remedies in arbitration of disputes over industrial IP rights see Smith et al., supra 
note 42, at 327 (USA), 332 (Canada), 338–39 (Germany), 345 (India), 351 (Australia), 355–56 (Japan); 
CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 99 (et seq.) Generally, on specific performance relief referred as 
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or transfer its right by waiver, assignment, restriction or sale, as well as bring 
about the cancelation of it.261 Hence, by consenting to arbitrate an IP dispute, 
an IP-holder could be compelled by a resulting award with inter-partes effect 
to surrender or agree upon the revocation of an asserted right with erga omnes 
effect.262 Nonetheless, by the same token that payment of royalties over a 
non-existing patent was deemed not problematic in the CJEU decision 
Genentech Inc. vs. Hoechst GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH 
c-567/14, of 7 July 2016, it seems a preferable solution to understand that 
“the arbitral tribunal would have somehow conferred an irrevocable royalty 
free license.” One is based on a contractual duty, the other on IP law. The 
underlying IP right, thus, can still be enforced against third parties as it is not 
removed from the public register.263 
At all events, this holds true only for those cases in which parties have 
not agreed on specific remedies together with the arbitration clause. 
Whenever parties consent to empower an arbitral tribunal to grant relief on 
transfer or revocation, such specific performance should be generally 
admitted. For example, imposing an obligation on the debtor to relinquish the 
asserted patent before the public register with, of course, erga omnes 
effect.264 
d. Jurisdictional Issues and Parallel Proceedings before Award 
Enforcement 
Major problems also arise at a pre-award stage, whenever arbitration 
proceedings are stayed because one of the parties challenges the validity of 
                                                                                                                           
 
“specific-performance oriented remedy, a remedy of conduct or a preventive remedy” see DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3–5 (4th ed. 2010). 
261 COOK & GARCIA, supra note 12, at 70 (Stating that: “[e]ntering into an agreement to arbitrate 
may constitute a perfectly acceptable contractual waiver of certain rights. Specifically, because parties 
can dispose of their [economic] rights, they can agree that based on the decision of an arbitrator they 
would not be entitled to enforce between them the rights conferred by the IPR in issue.”). 
262 Schäfer, supra note 94, at 915; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 13, at 100. 
263 COOK & GARCIA (2010), supra note 12, at 68; see also De Werra, supra note 13, at 359–60. For 
the decision see Section III.D.2.a, infra. 
264 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 16, 28 (Stating that: “[a]lternatively, the parties may agree 
that the arbitral tribunal’s remedial powers include orders of specific performance requiring a party to 
apply for revocation or transfer of an IP right. Such provision may go some way towards giving an award 
erga omnes effect.”). 
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the underlying IP right before competent state courts. This could also be the 
case if a regulatory authority investigates the subject matter to be decided by 
the arbitral tribunal.265 Secondly, whenever courts wrongly assume 
jurisdiction over the whole dispute without referring them to the ongoing 
arbitral procedure pursuant to Article II(3) of the New York Convention. 
Likewise, in cases where a party timely objects to the jurisdiction of an 
arbitral tribunal, which declines it in favor of state courts, but that party never 
claims IP invalidity before the competent authorities. Hence, in all scenarios, 
jurisdictional questions about the underlying IP rights are impairing a reliable 
enforcement of the transaction in dispute. At an international level, the high 
fragmentation of IP laws aggravates the problem by creating a significant 
risk of different answers across jurisdictions. 
In these scenarios, a preferable solution is applying the principle of lis 
pendens to suspend arbitral proceedings only in those cases where a party has 
rightfully challenged the validity of an asserted IP right before the competent 
state courts or is investigated by a regulatory agency. This is correct to the 
extent that domestic procedural laws provide answers consistent with the 
timing of arbitration.266 Such a solution minimizes the risk of duplicity of 
proceedings while assuring enforcement of IP transactions in a predictable 
fashion. In all other cases, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Model Law, arbitral 
tribunals should continue to decide on the dispute and, when necessary, 
incidentally adjudicate on IP validity with inter-partes effect. Only this way 
avoids situations in which domestic parallel proceedings obstruct 
international contract enforcement by the time it is necessary.267 For example, 
when a party objects to arbitration but does not claim IP invalidity before 
state courts, the right is neither removed from public registers nor its 
transaction reliably enforced inter-partes.268 
                                                                                                                           
 
265 Id. at 96–97 (giving the example of national antitrust agencies); COOK & GARCIA, supra note 
12, at 51. 
266 HAUBERG WILHELMSEN, supra note 69, at 193–95 (pointing out that Recast Brussels I 
Regulation No. 1215/2012 does not lay down unified, specific rules concerning parallel proceedings. She 
surveys several EU jurisdictions (Sweden, Germany, England, France) concluding that they do not share 
a common approach). 
267 PAULSSON, supra note 47, at 118–19. 
268 Schäfer, supra note 94, at 915 (stating: “[d]eclining to entertain the defense of invalidity for lack 
of objective arbitrability would then lead to a procedurally awkward situation, especially if the arbitration 
would be suspended and the concerned party would not file a nullity action.”); PAULSSON, supra note 47, 
at 78. 
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This holds true even if the underlying IP right is revoked by a court, and 
subsequently eliminated from the public register, either during the arbitral 
proceedings or after the arbitral tribunal renders a decision but before it is 
enforced.269 In case the decision is relevant for the outcome of the arbitration, 
which will be likelier for infringement cases than for contractual ones, as 
discussed above, an award-debtor may bring proof about the IP revocation 
into the arbitral proceedings under the applicable rules. Otherwise, it can seek 
to set aside the resulting award under the law of the seat or, better, get it 
modified in accordance with Article 34(4) of the Model Law, insofar as it is 
adopted by the applicable arbitration law: 
The court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate and so 
requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of time 
determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the 
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion 
will eliminate the grounds for setting aside.270 
Two shortcomings must be pointed out. On the one hand, costs of interim 
measures granted during arbitration must be restituted.271 On the other hand, 
the action to set aside faces the short timings of Article 34(3) of the Model 
Law: 
An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed 
from the date on which the party making that application had received the award 
or, if a request had been made under article 33 (correction and interpretation of 
award), from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral 
tribunal.272 
3. Practical Limitations 
a. Engineers’ Response: Designing Around the Award from a 
Different Location 
A complete understanding of innovation must take into account its 
sequential nature. This means considering already existing innovations 
                                                                                                                           
 
269 The constellation of cases after award-enforcement was just discussed above in Sections 
III.D.2.a and b, infra. 
270 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 34(4). 
271 For restitution claims under German law see CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 94. 
272 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW Article 34(3) (emphasis added). 
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generally protected by IP rights. A market player thus faces the decision 
whether to obtain a license on these existing IP rights and, so innovate “on,” 
or undertake an innovative step on its own—or outsource it—whose result 
falls outside of a right’s scope, and so innovate “around.”273 From an 
economic view, it is submitted that the more transaction costs loom over 
parties, the less innovating “on” will occur; innovators would rather invest in 
developing new creations.274 As seen, unpredictable, divergent non-
arbitrability policies for the enforcement of international awards increase the 
cost of IP contracting, since parties are forced to contractually allocate such 
risk or hedge it into the contractual price. At the margin, some players will 
be inhibited from innovating “around” and others, who still are building “on,” 
will partially lose competitiveness. 
By lowering uncertainty in enforcing IP transactions, a reliable 
enforcement of international awards with inter-partes effect enables parties 
to solve this conundrum, however, only to some extent. They can opt for 
innovating “on” whenever it is their economically best option and the optimal 
alternative from a social welfare perspective.275 Nonetheless, on the flip side, 
inter-partes effect eliminates the informative function of IP litigation as a 
positive externality. Without effecting amendments at the public register, the 
available information about other rights’ scope would be inaccurate so that 
innovating “around” will become more expensive, if possible at all, for third 
parties. 
Finally, there are cases in which modifications are not substantive-or 
technology-driven but aimed at falling beyond the concept protected by, for 
instance, the asserted patent claims. A solution to this issue resides with the 
arbitral tribunal’s capability and expertise in drafting its decision, since it 
should be accurate and far-sighted enough to grant relief to prevent this 
behavior from the debtor in the future.276 Arbitrators should emulate the 
                                                                                                                           
 
273 Based on the model of Buccafusco et al., supra note 17, at 7. (For the so-called “On/Around 
(O/A) decision.” In New Institutional Economics terms the authors point out three other factors that, added 
to the (1) Legal Framework, crucially affect the “O/A decision.” They are grouped in (2) Market; 
(3) Behavior of Innovators; and (4) Technological & Artistic.) See also Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around 
Copyright, 109 NW. L. REV. 547, 548 (2015) (for copyright). 
274 Buccafusco et al., supra note 17, at 68. 
275 Id. at 64–65 (exemplifying the bargain over sequential innovation). Id. at 60, 63 (stating “[t]he 
goal of IP policy is not to maximize creativity and innovation, but rather to optimize [them]” but without 
providing a clear-cut answer on what is the “O/A decision” to best achieve so). 
276 CHROCZIEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 130–31. 
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“patent law doctrine of equivalents.”277 At the international level, however, 
an award-debtor could move to a jurisdiction in which not even inter-partes 
effect is granted by the state courts. As a consequence, even when an award 
is masterly rendered, the IP-creditor will be forced to start costly and lengthy 
state-court IP proceedings anew, seeking injunction against the redesigned 
version. Geographical location of the operations, at inter- or intracompany 
levels, appears once more to be of the utmost importance, even in a post-
award phase. 
b. Predatory Litigation of Patent Trolls 
As shown by empirical data, improvement of enforcement as perceived 
by parties promotes IP litigation. In the United States, in the period between 
1983 and 2002, the number of patent suits tripled.278 Arguably, enforcement 
of international awards with inter-partes effect may become an additional 
tool to carry out anti-competitive practices such as predatory litigation at a 
cross-border level.279 This is principally sponsored by companies non-
operating in the industry, so-called patent trolls.280 Given that a patent troll 
does not risk losing its IP right against third parties in the market, precisely 
because of the limited effects recognized to an international award, it is ex 
ante more incentivized to commence frivolous or anticompetitive suits. In 
addition, arbitration is assumedly cheaper and faster than state court 
proceedings, thus further increasing incentives to initiate a larger number of 
anti-competitive lawsuits. 
                                                                                                                           
 
277 In the case law, London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Stressing that 
the application of the doctrine of equivalents is exceptional. It clarifies “[w]here an infringer, instead of 
inventing around a patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial change, 
essentially misappropriating or eve ‘stealing’ the patented invention, infringement may lie under the 
doctrine of equivalents.”). In the literature, Burk, supra note 273, at 551–52. 
278 JAFFEE & LERNER, supra note 28, at 14 (see chart therein). 
279 Economically, Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 516 (2003) (stressing the decreasing marginal cost of predatory 
litigation as efforts and reputation can be subsequently used: “[p]redatory litigation has an advantage over 
predatory pricing because the cost to the predator declines after the first lawsuit.”). 
280 Another type of anticompetitive practice concerning IP rights are the Patent Thickets. Carl 
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (Jaffe et al. eds., 2009) (defining it as: “[a] dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology.”); Martínez Pérez, supra note 97, at 392–93. 
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On the flip side, however, it must be stressed that enforcement with 
inter-partes effect of an award incidentally adjudicating on IP validity may 
also be in favor of respondents. On the one hand, nothing prevents a patent 
troll from initiating state court litigation, so eliminating IP arbitration is not 
a panacea. On the other hand, if an international award is not inter-partes 
enforced because of an arbitrability policy, respondents cannot claim IP 
invalidity to ward frivolous contractual or infringement claims off. As a 
result, respondents are deprived of a crucial defense to be raised against anti-
competitive practices. In conclusion, the threat of rent-seeking by anti-
competitive lawsuits does not necessarily speak against inter-partes effect of 
international IP awards. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: IN MEDIO STAT VIRTUS 
The conclusions of this research are two-tiered: 
i. The positive conclusion is a reinforcement of the idea that law is 
about trade-offs. On the one hand, international commercial 
arbitration, as a mechanism to solve cross-border IP disputes, 
sponsors enforcement of IP coordination as desired by parties. It is 
a reliable enforcement of contracts, not only of property rights per 
se, which enables credible commitments at low costs. This results 
in greater contractual surpluses and ultimately creates sustainable 
competitive advantages, by allocating specialization and 
innovation in a Pareto Superior fashion. 
On the other hand of the trade-off, the law eliminates contract 
enforcement whenever it envisages that individuals’ coordination 
is not socially desirable. For example, Article V(2) of the New 
York Convention leave, even ex officio, international awards 
unenforced on grounds of affecting third parties or public interest. 
Hence, it denies enforcement to the underlying international IP 
coordination, even if an agreement to arbitrate was deemed valid 
under the arbitrability policy of the law of the seat. 
ii. The normative conclusion hereto assumes that parties, facing non-
enforcement risk, will either walk away from commercial 
arbitration as a net-value-adding term or hedge bad cross-border IP 
arbitration by agreeing upon a lower price. Teleologically, and 
subject to ordinary limits of contract enforceability, a sound 
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economic argument as regards competitive advantages underpins a 
halfway position to the arbitrability trade-off. The operable 
solution is a predictable enforcement of international awards with 
inter-partes effect as early adopted in United States. Here, again, 
in medio stat virtus. 
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